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Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: History’s Unspoken Fourth
Amendment Anomaly
Brian R. Gallini*
The officer walking the beat has numerous tools at her disposal to
effectuate a warrantless search.1 One of the more popular of those
tools is the consent search;2 although no precise data exist on how
often consent searches are conducted, one study reports that
consent searches and searches incident to arrest are the two most
commonly utilized warrantless searches. 3 In that study, one
detective estimated that consent serves as the basis for ninety-eight
percent of all searches conducted. 4 Police may also request
consent even if they do not need it.5 At no point must an officer
advise the citizen that she can refuse consent.6
*
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1
See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (warrantless
automobile search); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (protective sweep
during execution of arrest warrant); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973) (consent searches); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)
(search incident to arrest); Chimel v. California 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (same);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1969) (stop and frisk premised on reasonable
suspicion); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (exigent circumstances).
2

George C. Thomas III, Time Travel, Hovercrafts, and the Framers:
James Madison Sees the Future and Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1451, 1505 (2005) (asserting that consent search “strategy has
proved so successful that it has largely replaced other justifications for searching
a suspect such as incident to arrest or in a Terry stop and frisk”).
3

JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 317 n.1 (4th ed. 2010) (citing
RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS:
PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES 21 (1985)).
4

Id.

5
E.g., Daniel L. Rotenberg, An Essay on Consent(Less) Police
Searches, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 175, 190 (1991) (noting that the California
Attorney General’s office encourages peace officers to always ask for consent,
even when they have other authority).
6

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 232-33.
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With the foregoing in mind, it would indeed be an understatement
to suggest that officers rely heavily on consent searches.
Academics generally view the Supreme Court’s current consent
search doctrine with disdain. 7 Courts and academics alike view
consent searches difficult to police given the pervasive discretion
that officers have in deciding who to ask for consent to search.8
And, allegations of racism pervade many state police officers’
consent search practices.9
If academics, courts, and the public appear uniformly skeptical of
current consent search practices—not, to be clear, the concept of
consent searches—a simple question arises: how did we get here?
7

See, e.g., George C. Thomas III, Terrorism, Race and a New
Approach to Consent Searches, 73 MISS. L.J. 525, 541 (2003) (“Consent is an
acid that has eaten away the Fourth Amendment.”); Rebecca Strauss, We Can
Do This the Easy Way or the Hard Way: The Use of Deceit to Induce Consent
Searches, 100 MICH. L. REV. 868, 876 (2002) (arguing that “[c]onsent searches
come dangerously close to general warrants by giving the searching police
officer undue discretion to determine the scope of the search”); Robert H.
Whorf, Consent Searches Following Routine Traffic Stops: The Troubled
Jurisprudence of a Doomed Drug Interdiction Technique, 28 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
1, 6 (2001) (contending that “the Fourth Amendment as presently interpreted
does almost nothing to protect motorists on the nation’s roadways from the
enormous intrusion of the routine traffic stop turned consent search”).
8

E.g., State v. Carty, 790 A.2d 903, 908 (N.J. 2002) (noting that the
result of officer discretion is that “a substantial number of drivers who travel the
roads of this state are at risk of being pulled over and asked by law enforcement
officials for consent to search their vehicles”); David A. Harris, The Reality of
Racial Disparity in Criminal Justice: The Significant of Data Collection, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 71, 91 (2003) (“[C]onsent searches give us an
invaluable measure of how police use discretion that is for all practical purposes
legally unbounded.”).
9
Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial
Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 674
(2000) (discussing allegations of discrimination against the Maryland State
Police); see, e.g., Andrew Barksdale, Fayetteville Police Chief Defends Searches
Before
City
Council,
FAYOBSERVER.COM,
June
7,
2011,
http://www.fayobserver.com/articles/2011/06/06/1099629?sac=
(expressing
concern that police in Fayetteville, Arkansas, are disproportionately asking
black drivers for consent to search); Will Guzzardi, ACLU: Illinois State Police
Show Racial Bias in Traffic Stops, HUFFPOST CHICAGO, June 7, 2011,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/07/aclu-illinois-statepolic_n_872586.html (“Years of public data show that a practice called a
‘consent search,’ where officers ask to search a car despite having insufficient
legal evidence for the search, disproportionately targets minority drivers.”);
More Footage of Alleged SFPD Misconduct Aired, FOXRENO.COM, May 27,
2011, http://www.foxreno.com/news/27929588/detail.html (documenting the
falsification by officers of consent by an individual where, in fact, no consent
existed).
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To answer that question, step back to 1969 when Warren Burger
replaced Earl Warren as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.10 At
that time, many believed Burger’s “law and order” background
foretold overruling the so-called Warren Court trilogy—Gideon
(requiring that counsel be appointed for indigent defendants),
Mapp (extending the exclusionary rule to the states), and Miranda
(requiring officers to provide warnings to suspects subject to
custodial interrogation). 11 That, of course, never happened; 12 a
significant handful of important commentators and historians
therefore view the Burger Court’s criminal procedure decisions as,
in a word, anticlimactic.13 That popular view, however, overlooks
the Burger Court’s crowning—but unspoken—anti-Miranda
achievement:
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 14
Schneckloth
remarkably made clear that warning citizens of their constitutional
rights had no place outside the context of custodial interrogation—
where the vast majority of society spends its life. 15
Admittedly, the scholarship assessing the merits of Schneckloth is
pervasive. 16 A casual overview of scholarship considering the
10

BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 313

11

Id. at 331.

(1993).

12

In retrospect, Justice Marshall expressed confusion about Chief
Justice Burger’s personality and the fact that Miranda was not overruled. JUAN
WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 375
(1998). He said, in recalling the Chief, “I can tell you this . . . [t]here were
enough votes here to get rid of the Miranda rules. And Burger wouldn’t let it go
through. He just hung it up.” Id.
See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 331 (“It can, indeed, be said
that no important Warren Court decision was overruled during the Burger
tenure.”); Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So DefenseMinded?), The Burger Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police
Investigatory Practices, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION
THAT WASN’T 68 (V. Blasi ed. 1983) (discussing two versions of the Burger
Court, only one of which seemed to desire “gutt[ing]” the Warren Court’s
decisions). And, although Miranda was not expressly overruled, a significant
handful of Burger Court decisions so drastically limited Miranda’s applicability
and thereby tacitly overruled at least significant portions of the decision. See
note 160, infra, and accompanying citations.
13

14

412 U.S. 218 (1973).

15

Id. at 245 n.33.

16

See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, The Good and Bad News About Consent
Searches in the Supreme Court, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 27 (2008); Morgan
Cloud, Ignorance and Democracy, 39 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1143 (2007); Christo
Lassiter, Consent to Search by Ignorant People, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1171,
1172 (2007); Daniel R. Williams, Misplaced Angst: Another Look at ConsentSearch Jurisprudence, 82 IND. L.J. 69 (2007); Note, The Fourth Amendment and
Antidilution: Confronting the Overlooked Function of the Consent Search
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opinion reflects thoughtful arguments about why effective
warnings to citizens about their Fourth Amendment rights should
precede consent searches. 17
Consider also Professor Ric
Simmons’s well-reasoned article arguing to eliminate
Schneckloth’s voluntariness test altogether.18 And, by way of final
illustrative example, one commentator has persuasively asserted
that the Supreme Court’s consent jurisprudence has offered almost
no guidance on plain view seizures in the context of limited
consent searches.19 Yet, no article has asked a more fundamental
question about the Schneckloth opinion: why? In particular, what
set of circumstances led the Court to conclude that the Fourth
Amendment does not require that citizens be informed of their
right to refuse consent? And a related question: why did the
opinion’s author, Justice Stewart, go so far as to assert that
Doctrine, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2187 (2006); Brian A. Sutherland, Note, Whether
Consent to Search was Given Voluntarily: A Statistical Analysis of Factors That
Predict the Suppression Rulings of the Federal District Courts, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 2192 (2006); John F. Decker et al., Curbing Aggressive Police Tactics
during Routine Traffic Stops in Illinois, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 819 (2005); David
John Housholder, Note, Reconciling Consent Searches and Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence: Incorporating Privacy into the Test for Valid Consent Searches,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1279 (2005); Steven L. Chanenson, Get the Facts, Jack!
Empirical Research and the Changing Constitutional Landscape of Consent
Searches, 71 TENN. L. REV. 399 (2004); Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine
Traffic Stop” from Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,” Not Enough Fourth
Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843 (2004); Dana Raigrodski, Consent
Engendered: A Feminist Critique of Consensual Fourth Amendment Searches,
16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 37 (2004); Marcy Strauss, Criminal Law:
Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. Crim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211 (2002); Robert H.
Whorf, Consent Searches Following Routine Traffic Stops: The Troubled
Jurisprudence of a Doomed Drug Interdiction Technique, 28 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
1 (2001); Christo Lassiter, Eliminating Consent from the Lexicon of Traffic Stop
Interrogations, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 79 (1998); Adrian J. Barrio, Note, Rethinking
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Incorporating Obedience Theory into the Supreme
Court’s Conception of Voluntary Consent, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 215; Robert V.
Ward, Consenting to a Search and Seizure in Poor and Minority
Neighborhoods: No Place for a “Reasonable Person,” 36 HOW. L.J. 239 (1993).
17

E.g., Matthew Phillips, Effective Warnings Before Consent Searches:
Practice, Necessary, and Desirable, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1185, 1203-10
(2008) (reviewing empirical evidence that significantly undermines the
Schneckloth Court’s contention that warnings would be “thoroughly
impractical”).
Ric Simmons, Not “Voluntary” but Still Reasonable: A New
Paradigm for Understanding the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773,
823 (2005) (arguing that a “reasonableness” inquiry should replace the
voluntariness test whereby courts undertake an objective inquiry into the
conduct of law enforcement).
18

19

Michael J. Friedman, Comment, Another Stab at Schneckloth: The
Problem of Limited Consent Searches and Plain View Seizures, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 313, 331-32 (1998).
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administering a right to refuse consent warning would be
“thoroughly impractical”?20
This Article argues that Schneckloth should be overruled in light of
dramatic changes in politics and our factual understanding of
consent searches, illustrated by three key examples. First, there is
no pressure on the modern Supreme Court similar to that present
around the fevered post-Miranda—and post Warren Court—time
of Schneckloth. Second, several states have confirmed that the
premise
underlying
Schneckloth—administering
Fourth
Amendment consent warnings would be “thoroughly
impractical” 21 —is simply wrong. Finally, post-Miranda impact
literature confirms that Miranda did little to impact confessions;
there is analogously good reason to expect that most people would
still give consent to search even if previously told they were not
required to do so. Accordingly, the Article contends, the
Schneckloth opinion—issued by a Court packed with four Nixon
appointees—was, in hindsight, a predictable backlash to the
Warren Court generally and Miranda specifically.
Part I tells the fascinating behind-the-scenes historical story of
Schneckloth and how a majority of the Court concluded that
providing citizens with a right to refuse consent warning would be
“thoroughly impractical.” To do so, Part I considers the social and
judicial climates in and around 1973—alongside the departure of
Chief Justice Warren—and reviews the Justices’ private papers,22
the Court’s exchange of Schneckloth-related memoranda, and the
parties’ briefs and oral arguments.
Part II then considers whether a right to refuse consent warning
remains thoroughly impractical—according to the Schneckloth
Court’s concerns—over three decades later.
By properly
understanding Schneckloth in its broader historical context, Part II
reveals its truly anomalous nature and similarly reveals why the
20

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231.

21

As an interesting historical aside, Justice Powell so liked this
language that he underlined it in a draft opinion and made notations of emphasis
in the margins. First Draft of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte Majority Opinion
(April 13, 1973) (on file with Washington & Lee University School of Law,
Lewis Powell Papers, Box 151, File, “Bustamonte Folder 10”).
22

Unfortunately, then-Chief Justice Burger is excluded from those
whose private papers were evaluated in authoring this article. Warren E. Burger
Collection, GREGG SWEM LIBRARY: SPECIAL COLLECTIONS RESEARCH CENTER,
http://swem.wm.edu/scrc/Burger.cfm (last visited June 9, 2011) (“In accordance
with the donor agreement, the Warren E. Burger Papers will be closed to
researchers until 2026.”).
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Court now—not currently burdened by historical circumstances
similar to those present in Schneckloth—should reconsider whether
the Fourth Amendment requires officers to inform citizens of their
right to refuse consent.
I.
The seeds for the Court’s decision in Schneckloth were planted
long before the opinion’s actual issuance on May 29, 1973.23 This
part explores those historical seeds and, to do so, begins by seeking
to answer an overarching question:
how did we get to
Schneckloth? Given the general understanding that the Supreme
Court is not immune from public opinion,24 Section A focuses on
the social posture of our country in and around 1973. It likewise
explores the Supreme Court’s transition—begun in 1969—away
from Earl Warren’s time as Chief Justice and into Warren Burger’s
tenure. With that section in mind, Section B explores the
Schneckloth opinion, its lower court history, and the parties’
arguments before the Supreme Court.
A. Setting the stage for Schneckloth.
At varying levels, scholars generally agree that what goes on in
society outside the hallowed halls of the Supreme Court influences
the individual justices. 25 Whether that phenomenon is properly
23

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 218 (providing the date of decision in the
case caption).
24

Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, The Judiciary and the Popular
Will: Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court? Possibly Yes (But
We're Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 263, 280 (2010) (conducting a
study on the influence of public opinion on Supreme Court decision-making and
concluding “[a]t the least, our results indicate that an association exists between
the public's mood and the Court’s decisions”); BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF
THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND
SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 14 (2009) (“[T]he modern era is
one of symbiotic relationship between popular opinion and judicial review.”);
Norman Dorsen, How American Judges Interpret the Bill of Rights, 11 CONST.
COMMENTARY 379, 388 (1994) (“[J]udges . . . do not live in a disembodied
vacuum, but exist as part of the hard real world where their decisions will be
closely reviewed by every segment of society and ultimately redound to each
judge’s enhanced or impaired reputation.”).
25

THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT
161 (1989) (“Typically, the Court disproportionately uses its grants of certiorari
to pick out lower court decisions that disagree with public opinion, and then to
reverse many inconsistent lower court decisions.”); see, e.g., Kevin T. McGuire
& James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence of
Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018, 1033
(2004) (“[P]ublic opinion is a powerful influence on the decisions of the
Supreme Court[.]”); Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the
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called “legal realism” 26 or, more simply, is illustrative of public
opinion’s influence on Supreme Court decision-making,27 the point
is hopefully clear: the Supreme Court cares about what is
happening in the world.28 This makes some sense given that, on a

Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 807, 813 (2004) (“[I]t has been noted that the justices may
be influenced by public opinion to ensure the institutional legitimacy of the
Court.”); Kelly A. MacGrady & John W. Van Doren, AALS Constitutional Law
Panel on Brown, Another Council of Nicaea? 35 AKRON L. REV. 371, 387
(2002) (reviewing scholarship concluding “that public opinion more often than
not leads the Supreme Court so that judges then ‘discover’ new rights in the
Constitution”).
26

See, e.g., Emily Sherwin, The Jurisprudence of Pleading: Rights,
Rules, and Conley v. Gibson, 52 HOW. L.J. 73, 80-81 (2008); Eric R. Claeys,
Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549,
1641 (2003); J. M. Balkin, Frontiers of Legal Thought II the New First
Amendment: Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the
First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 388. Professor William E. Nelson
helpfully defines legal realism as follows:
A realist believes that judges must bring something else to the
table. But what else? Here I need to draw an overly sharp,
analytical distinction. On the one hand, a judge might see
herself as an agent of society who is under a duty to make law
conform to the wishes of society. If such a judge thinks of
society as a train, law will appear as the caboose at the end of
the train, and the judge’s job will be to keep the caboose on
the same track as the train. On the other hand, a judge might
see himself as society’s commander. Looking upon society as
a train, law will emerge as the engine, and the judge as the
engineer who must determine the direction that the train
ultimately will take.
William E. Nelson, Childress Lecture: Brown v. Board of Education and the
Jurisprudence of Legal Realism, 48 ST. LOUIS L.J. 795, 799 (2004).
27

E.g., Robert E. Riggs, The Supreme Court and Same-Sex Marriage:
A Prediction, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 345, 377 (2006) (suggesting “the Court may
conserve its legitimacy by not going too far beyond the area of public
acceptance”); Bruce Ledewitz, Corporate Advertising’s Democracy, 12 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 389, 452 n.323 (2003) (noting “[p]ublic opinion probably is a
factor in Supreme Court decision-making”).
28

The Court has admitted as much, at least in the context of its Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173
(1976) (“[Eighth Amendment analysis] requires, rather, that we look to objective
indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction.”); Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (“The clause of
the Constitution in the opinion of the learned commentators may be therefore
progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.” (internal citation
omitted)).
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more basic level, social science literature confirms we are all to
some extent influenced by external factors when making decisions
in our own lives.29 It is therefore seemingly impossible to ignore
what was happening—and how much was happening—in America
around the time of Schneckloth.
In particular, the changing nature and volume of police-citizen
encounters certainly suggests, in hindsight, that the Supreme
Court’s creation in Schneckloth of a more law enforcementfriendly consent doctrine was no temporal accident. 30 The
Schneckloth defendant—Robert Clyde Bustamonte—was arrested
in 1967, 31 just as domestic involvement in Vietnam increased. 32
As criticism of that involvement also increased, 33 so too did the
conflict itself; the conflict peaked with the Viet Cong New Year
offensive, 34 and Americans grew increasingly concerned about
whether the war could be won following the Tet offensive.35 Yet,
the public was also deeply concerned about poverty issues, civil
rights, the threat of nuclear war, and environmental issues.36 The
division in American popular thought was perhaps best illustrated
by the 1968 election of Richard Nixon as President, who earned
only 43.5 percent of the popular vote.37
29

See, e.g., BYRON M. ROTH & JOSH D. MULLEN, DECISION MAKING:
ITS LOGIC AND PRACTICE 22 (2002) (discussing how the human need to have a
“coherent and consistent view of the world” can impact decision making); ROB
RANYARD ET AL., DECISION MAKING: COGNITIVE MODELS AND EXPLANATIONS
75 (1997) (discussing the impact of external events on personal decision
making); CAROL H. WEISS & MICHAEL J. BUCUVALAS, SOCIAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH AND DECISION MAKING 117 (1980) (discussing the role of location,
experience, and background characteristics in decision making).
NAT’L ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968),
http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/kerner.pdf.
30

31

People v. Bustamonte, 76 Cal. Rptr. 17, 18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969)
(noting Bustamonte’s full name).
32

TODD GITLIN, THE SIXTIES: YEARS OF HOPE, DAYS OF RAGE 261
(1987) (discussing the doubling and redoubling of American troops in Vietnam
between 1965 and 1967).
Id. (“[M]ost antiwar movers and shakers shook off their leftover faith
in negotiations and endorsed immediate withdrawal.”)
33

34

DAVID FARBER, THE SIXTIES: FROM MEMORY TO HISTORY 108

35

Id. at 108.

(1994).

36

MAURICE ISSERMAN & MICHAEL KAZIN, AMERICA DIVIDED: THE
CIVIL WAR OF THE 1960S 288 (2008).
37

ALLEN J. MATUSOW, THE UNRAVELING OF AMERICA 437 (1987).
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Even as the Vietnam War drew to a close along with the decade,
societal chaos continued. 38 Dr. Martin Luther King’s death in
Memphis on April 4, 1968, 39 sparked rioting in the city and
required the aid of 4,000 National Guardsmen.40 Then, 1969 saw
the beginnings of militant gay activism,41 a momentous push by
the women’s liberation movement that prompted adoption of the
Equal Rights Amendment, 42 and issuance of the landmark
Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education.43
Collectively, the social tensions arising from the Vietnam War and
the civil rights movement gave rise to mass demonstrations and
protests unlike any the country had ever before seen. 44 By way of
illustrative example, nearly 150 American cities experienced civil
unrest in the summer of 1967 alone.45 Law enforcement officials
were often uncertain as to appropriate responses and measures of
force to use in light of these unprecedented civil disturbances.46 In
short, the police were encountering citizens outside of the custodial
context in numbers they had never previously experienced.47
The tenuous environment in and around America during the time
of Bustamonte’s criminal case was arguably heightened by the
wake left behind by the Warren Court.48 Although Earl Warren sat
38

ISSERMAN & KAZIN, supra note 36, at 297.

39
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.—Biography, THE KING CENTER,
http://www.thekingcenter.org/drmlkingjr/ (last visited July 1, 2011).
40

Earl Caldwell, Guard Called Out, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1968, at 1.

41

ISSERMAN AND KAZIN, supra note 36, at 288 (discussing the
Stonewall Riots of June 1969, which “sparked the organization of a new
activist-oriented homosexual rights movement.”)
42

FARBER, supra note 34, at 162.

43

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

44

DAVID STEIGERWALD, THE SIXTIES AND THE END OF MODERN
AMERICA 187 (1995).
Id. at 187 (“Beginning with the 1965 Watts riot in Los Angeles
through July 1968, over one hundred cities experienced riots...189 people were
killed, 7, 614 were injured, 59, 257 were arrested, and nearly $160 million in
property was damaged.”)
45

NAT’L ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968),
http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/kerner.pdf.
46

47

Id.

48

THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 34 (Mark Tushnet, ed., 1993) (referring to the Warren Court as a “cultural
phenomenon” and noting that “[m]any observers sense . . . that the Warren
Court was quite unusual in United States history”).

9

as Chief Justice on the Court from 1953 until his retirement in
1969,49 commentators often refer to the “Warren Court” to mean
the time spanning from 1961, when Arthur Goldberg replaced
Felix Frankfurter on the Court, to 1969, when Warren retired. 50
During that period, the Court issued rulings about an inordinate
number of controversial issues like those related, for example, to
indigent criminal defense trial 51 and appellate representation, 52
marital privacy, 53 and state voting rights. 54 Those decisions,
alongside so many other Warren Court decisions,55 set off quite the
49

See JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 8 (4th ed. 2010).
Shortly after Warren announced he would step down from serving as Governor
of California, Chief Justice Fred Vinson died. SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at
265. President Dwight Eisenhower had previously promised Warren the first
open seat on the Court, and Warren considered that promise to include any
opening—including the seat of Chief Justice. MICHAL R. BELKNAP, THE
SUPREME COURT AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE WARREN COURT
REVOLUTION 1 (2011). At the end of September 1953, with Congress no longer
in session, Warren received a recess appointment to the Court. DENIS STEVEN
RUTKUS & LORRAINE H. TONG, THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES 24
(2007). The Senate ultimately confirmed him on March 1, 1954. See
SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 265.
50

Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A QuarterCentury Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1, 2 (1995); THE WARREN COURT IN
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 7 (Mark Tushnet, ed., 1993). Still
others regard the Warren Court in terms of its revolution in criminal
procedure—beginning in 1961 its decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), to 1966 or 1967, Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Constitution and the Police:
Individual Rights and Law Enforcement, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 11, 12 (1988);
Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and
the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 519 n.4. The Court’s decision in
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding unconstitutional
state laws that established separate public schools for black and white students),
is not generally considered part of the “Warren Court.” THE WARREN COURT IN
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (Mark Tushnet, ed., 1993).
51

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (interpreting the Sixth
Amendment to require that states provide counsel to indigent criminal
defendants).
52

Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (broadening the
availability of appellate counsel to indigent defendants).
53
Griswold v. Connecticut, 81 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a state ban
on the use of contraceptives violated the right to marital privacy).
54

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (requiring that legislative
districts across states be equal in population).
55

See also, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
(establishing actual malice as the libel/defamation standard for press reports
about public officials); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requiring the
prosecution to disclose “material” evidence to the defense); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
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countrywide public outcry.56 “Impeach Earl Warren” signs littered
the countryside, 57 and the Court endured criticism from, among
other prominent critics, the American Bar Association, the
National Association of Attorneys General, and Judge Learned
Hand of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.58 Even
Congress joined the fray by refusing to authorize a pay increase for
the Justices,59 and seeking to limit the Court’s jurisdiction.60
Thus, although Bustamonte’s story spanned six years—from 19671973—the outcome in Schneckloth (alongside the nature of the
Court’s questions during oral argument) 61 undoubtedly seems
informed by the social impact of the Warren Court’s decisions
prior to 1967. 62 Chief Justice Warren initially announced his
retirement on June 13, 1968 and, to replace him, President Lyndon

56
Alden Whitman, For 16 Years, Warren Saw the Constitution as
Protector of Rights and Equality, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1974, at 24 (recalling
signs calling for Warren’s impeachment and noting President Eisenhower’s
reflective comment that appointing Warren was “the biggest damned-fool
mistake I ever made”); Paul Crowell, Pickets Jeer Warren Here and Hurl
Placards at Him, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1963, at 1 (noting the demonstration
“had been intended to emphasize displeasure with the Supreme Court’s activities
since Justice Warren was appointed 10 years ago”).
57

Compare Robert Barnes, In Emotionally Charged Times, Calls Arise
for Impeachment of a Justice or Two, THE WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 1, 2010, at
A19 (recalling the “‘Impeach Earl Warren’ billboards that sprouted across the
South after the court’s desegregation rulings”), with ‘Impeach Earl Warren’
Sign Posted on Highway Upstate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1963, at 36
(documenting appearance of “Impeach Earl Warren” signs in New York).
58

LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 27 (1983).
Warren was stung by the American Bar Association’s criticism; he resigned
from the organization. Id.
59

Russell Baker, Observer: The Precious Impeachable Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 21, 1965, at E10.
60

William G. Ross, Attacks on the Warren Court by State Officials: A
Case Study of Why Court-Curbing Movements Fail, 50 BUFFALO L. REV. 483,
484 (2002).
61

See Part I(B), infra, and accompanying discussion (discussing, in
particular, the Court’s questioning during the Schneckloth oral argument which,
in part, focused on whether Miranda-style warnings should be required in
consent-search scenarios).
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 285 (“[The Warren Court’s]
impact on a whole society’s way of life can be compared only with that caused
by the political revolution or military conflict.”). Of Chief Justice Warren
specifically, Justice Marshall would later comment: “When history is written,
he’ll go down as one of the greatest Chief Justices the country has ever been
blessed with. I think he is irreplaceable.” Warren Rites Slated Tomorrow, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 1974, at 34.
62
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B. Johnson nominated sitting Associate Justice Abe Fortas.63 Yet,
because of questionable off-bench conduct—most notably, his
acceptance of a $20,000 fee from a friend under investigation by
federal authorities for violating securities laws—a Senate filibuster
blocked his confirmation.64 Warren therefore remained as Chief
for one additional year because Johnson’s term as President was
set to expire before another nominee could be considered.65 When
Chief Justice Burger was finally sworn in to fill Warren’s position
on June 23, 1969, 66 he was anxious to distance his tenure from
Warren’s legacy.67 Of particular note was Chief Justice Burger’s
criticism of the Warren Court’s most famous decision—Miranda v.
Arizona.68
Yet, the seeds for Miranda were planted by the Warren Court’s
decision in Escobedo v. Illinois two years earlier 69 —a decision
Justice Burger likewise disliked. 70 The year was 1964 and law
63
Linda Greenhouse, Warren E. Burger is Dead at 87; Was Chief
Justice for 17 Years, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1995, at A1.
64

Id.

65

Id.

66

Id.

67

Robert B. Semple, Jr., Warren E. Burger Named Chief Justice by
Nixon; Now on Appeals Bench, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1969, at 1 (noting Burger’s
thematic criticism of the Warren Court, including his comments that the
Supreme Court has ignored “‘the moral basis of the criminal law’”); see Sidney
Zion, A Decade of Constitutional Revision, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1979, at SM1
(“The criminal-justice revolution forged by the Warren Court has been virtually
dismantled through a series of decisions [by the Burger Court] that have sharply
limited the rights of suspects[.]”). Despite his anxiousness, history has generally
concluded that Burger’s goal to supplant many of the Warren Court’s rulings
went unfulfilled. Linda Greenhouse, Warren E. Burger is Dead at 87; Was
Chief Justice for 17 Years, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1995, at A1 (“While there were
some substantial changes of emphasis, the Burger Court—a label liberals tended
to apply like an epithet—overruled no major decisions from the Warren era.”);
Stephen Gillers, Burger’s Warren Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1983, at E19
(“Predictions of the death of the death of the Warren Court have been
considerably overstated.”).
68

E.g., EARL M. MALTZ, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF WARREN BURGER,
1969-1986 9 (2000) (“Burger’s opinions and speeches criticizing the Mallory
and Miranda rules on confessions . . . earned him the respect of more
conservative members of Congress and often found their way into the
Congressional Record.”); Fred P. Graham, Chief Justice Burger, N.Y. TIMES,
May 25, 1969, at E2 (noting that Miranda is “[o]ne Supreme Court decision of
which Judge Warren Burger has been particularly critical”).
69

378 U.S. 478 (1964).

Julius Duscha, Chief Justice Burger asks: ‘If it Doesn’t Make Good
Sense, How Can it Make Good Law’, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1969, at SM30 (noting
that Burger has his “deepest disagreement” with Miranda and Escobedo).
70
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enforcement agencies nationwide were debating what limits
existed—other than a prohibition against officers’ use of the third
degree 71 —when interrogating a suspect. 72 For years prior, the
Supreme Court dictated that a due process “voluntariness” standard
governed the interrogation room; indeed, as early as 1884, the
Supreme Court declared, “[a] confession, if freely and voluntarily
made, is evidence of the most satisfactory character.” 73 The
voluntariness standard, however, allowed for considerable
interpretive differences;74 the Supreme Court’s desire to identify a
more precise method of evaluating interrogation methods therefore
persisted. 75 But, given the Court’s focus on eradicating more
violent methods of extracting a confession, police were minimally
entitled to think that the non-violent behavior of law enforcement
in Escobedo was constitutionally permissible.
Welcome in Danny Escobedo, a twenty-two-year-old of Mexican
descent working as a laborer in Chicago.76 Escobedo’s brother-in“The ‘third degree’ is an overarching term that refers to a variety of
coercive interrogation strategies, ranging from psychological duress such as
prolonged confinement to extreme physical violence and torture.” Richard A.
Leo, The Third Degree and the Origins of Psychological Interrogation in the
United States, in 20 INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 37, 42
(G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004). Although the “third degree” method of
interrogation was popular in the early part of the twentieth century, see NAT’L
COMM. ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN
LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931), the Supreme Court would soon make clear that the
techniques employed by interrogators utilizing the “third degree” were
unconstitutional, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944);
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238-42 (1940).
71

72

FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS 165 (1962) (noting that interrogation procedures were changing
and cautioning that the Supreme Court “may eventually require the warning as
an element of due process in state cases”).
73

Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584 (1884); accord Bram v. United
States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897).
74

Compare Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323-24 (1959)
(concluding that a confessing defendant’s will was overborne by police tactics
that, inter alia, exploited defendant’s poor education and emotional nature,
relied on multiple lengthy interrogations, denied counsel, and relied on a
trickery from a false friend), with Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 292
(1941) (concluding that an uneducated defendant’s confession was voluntary
despite police interrogation that involved physical contact, sleep deprivation,
prolonged interrogation sessions, and denial of counsel).
75
Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and
the Good Old Days of Police Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 754 (1987)
(asserting that “the Court became disaffected from its own work product” in the
context of the voluntariness standard).
76

BAKER, supra note 58, at 28.
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law was killed on January 19, 1960, and the police immediately
suspected Escobedo’s involvement. 77
Specifically, police
suspected that Escobedo hired another individual, Benedict
DiGerlando, to murder his brother-in-law because he frequently
beat his wife—Escobedo’s sister.78 The police arrested Escobedo
at 2:30 a.m. the next morning at his sister’s home and he was
thereafter transported to the police station, where he was
questioned for between fourteen to fifteen hours.79 Remarkably,
he made no statement and was released because insufficient
evidence existed to hold him.80
Ten days later, sometime between 7:30 and 8:00 p.m. on January
30, DiGerlando told police while in custody that Escobedo was the
shooter. 81 Based on DiGerlando’s statement, police arrested
Escobedo and his sister between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m.82 While on
the way to the station, officers told Escobedo that he was identified
as the shooter;83 “[w]e have you sewed up pretty tight,” an officer
told him, but Escobedo did not take the bait.84 Instead, Escobedo
said, first, he would like to have advice from his lawyer and, 85
second, that he wanted to hear DiGerlando accuse him directly.86
Officers therefore arranged a stationhouse confrontation between
Escobedo and DiGerlando at around 10:00 p.m., during which the
latter accused Escobedo of having done the shooting.87 Escobedo
responded by saying “I didn’t shoot Manual, you did it.”88
Meanwhile, outside the interrogation room, Escobedo’s lawyer
arrived at the police station at around 10:30 p.m. and sought
permission from several officers to see Escobedo.89 His repeated
People v. Escobedo, 190 N.E.2d 825, 826 (Ill. 1963), rev’d sub nom.
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
77

78

Id.

79

BAKER, supra note 58, at 28.

80

Id.; Escobedo, 190 N.E.2d at 826.

81

Escobedo, 190 N.E.2d at 826.

82

Id.

83

Id.

84

BAKER, supra note 58, at 29.

85

Id. (noting that Escobedo asked for his lawyer again upon arriving at
the station).
86

Escobedo, 190 N.E.2d at 826.

87

Id.

88

BAKER, supra note 58, at 29.

89

Escobedo, 190 N.E.2d at 826.
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requests were denied.90 At one point during the night, Escobedo
and his lawyer saw one another through an open door and waved;
police thereafter promptly shut the door. 91 Escobedo’s lawyer
ultimately left the station at 1:00 a.m. without having spoken with
Escobedo.92 After his lawyer departed, Escobedo went on to make
additional incriminating statements.93
Prior to Escobedo’s subsequent trial, he unsuccessfully sought to
suppress his confession.94 Although he conceded that no officer
beat or threatened him, 95 he did contend that he incriminated
himself for two reasons. First, he testified, “I seen that my sister
was being put at the head of this crime and I knew she had not
done it and I wanted to help my sister and that is the reason why I
made the statement.” 96 Second, he contended that a Spanishspeaking officer claimed to be a friend of his brother and, outside
the hearing of any other officer, promised that Escobedo would not
be prosecuted if he agreed to be a witness against DiGerlando. 97 A
jury found Escobedo guilty and he was sentenced to twenty years
imprisonment.98
On May 27, 1963, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court’s denial of his motion to suppress the confession, despite
Escobedo’s contention that it should be inadmissible because he
had previously requested counsel.99 Months later, on July 1, 1963,
Escobedo filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court; the Court agreed to hear Escobedo’s case on November 12,
1963, and set oral argument for April 29, 1964.100

90

Id.

91

BAKER, supra note 58, at 29.

92

Escobedo, 190 N.E.2d at 826.

93

BAKER, supra note 58, at 30.

94

Escobedo, 190 N.E.2d at 827.

95

Id. at 826.

96

Id.

97

Id. at 826-27.

98

Id. at 826.

99

Id. at 827-31.

100

Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 478 (noting the date of oral argument).
Interestingly, Escobedo filed his petition to the Supreme Court eleven days after
Ernest Miranda’s trial in Arizona. BAKER, supra note 58, at 31.
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The Supreme Court decided Escobedo v. Illinois on June 22,
1964. 101 Writing for a five-member majority, Justice Goldberg
reversed the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision.102 A lengthy and
awkward Sixth Amendment holding—complete with a lengthy list
of prerequisite conditions—supported the Court’s reversal:103
[W]here, as here, the investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect
has been taken into police custody, the police carry
out a process of interrogations that lends itself to
eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has
requested and been denied an opportunity to consult
with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively
warned him of his absolute constitutional right to
remain silent, the accused has been denied “the
Assistance of Counsel” in violation of the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution . . . and that no
statement elicited by the police during the
interrogation may be used against him at a criminal
trial.[104]
The rationale underlying the Court’s run-on single sentence
holding was equally notable. In stirring language, Justice
Goldberg reasoned, “[w]e have learned the lesson of history,
ancient and modern, that a system of criminal law enforcement
which comes to depend on the ‘confession’ will, in the long run, be
less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which
depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through
skillful investigation.”105
The Court’s decision in Escobedo served notice: things were
going to change inside the interrogation room.
The law
enforcement community, however, was not anxious to embrace
change. 106 New York’s police commissioner accused the
101

Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 478 (noting the date of decision).

102

Id. at 492.

The Escobedo holding’s Sixth Amendment foundation was
relatively short-lived; the Court re-characterized Escobedo as a Fifth
Amendment decision in 1972. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
103

104

Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490-91.

105

Id. at 488-89 (footnotes omitted).

106
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS
391-92 (2000) (discussing the unreceptive reaction to Escobedo among police).
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Escobedo decision as joining a series of Supreme Court decisions
that “unduly hampered” law enforcement.107 And the Philadelphia
District Attorney went so far as to state his belief that certain
killings “‘were spawned by the Court’s liberal interpretations of
the Constitution.’”108
The judiciary likewise did not receive Escobedo with uniform
approval. Concededly, a handful of lower court decisions
interpreted Escobedo broadly. 109 California’s Supreme Court
interpreted Escobedo to require the provision of counsel—even in
the absence of a defendant’s request—by construing interrogation
as a “critical stage” for Sixth Amendment purposes. 110 The
Supreme Court of Oregon held that Escobedo required that law
enforcement warn a defendant of his right to remain silent.111 And,
finally, the Supreme Court of Tennessee applied Escobedo’s
precise language to a case it believed was factually similar.112
More representative of the cold reception with which the judiciary
gave Escobedo, though, were the significant handful of lower
courts that sought to limit its implications.113 The Seventh Circuit
and the state of Maryland, for example, declined to extend
Escobedo to factual scenarios wherein defendant did not

107

E.g., Sidney E. Zion, High Court Scored on Crime Rulings: Bars
Against Confessions, Searches and Seizures Attached by Murphy, N.Y. TIMES,
May 14, 1965, at 39 (“Police Commissioner Michael J. Murphy sharply
criticized the United States Supreme Court yesterday for a series of decisions on
confessions and searches and seizures which he said ‘unduly hampered’ law
enforcement.”).
108

Sidney E. Zion, Attorneys Chafe at Crime Rulings: Prosecutors
Fear the Guilty Will be Able to Avoid Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1965, at 61.
109

E.g., United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429, 437
(3d Cir. 1965); Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 200 N.E.2d 264, 266 (Mass.
1964). Although the Third Circuit’s decision Russo held that no request for
counsel was necessary to trigger Escobedo’s protections, 351 F.2d at 437, the
New Jersey Supreme Court flagrantly disregarded that ruling by instructing all
of its state judges to ignore the Russo ruling, Sidney E. Zion, Jersey to Ignore
U.S. Court Ruling on Confessions, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1965, at 1.
110

People v. Dorado, 398 P.2d 361, 367 (Cal. 1965).

111

State v. Neely, 395 P.2d 557, 561 (Ore. 1964).

112

Campbell v. State, 384 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1964).

113

E.g., Commonwealth v. Negri, 213 A.2d 670, 676 (Pa. 1965);
Wamsley v. Commonwealth, 137 S.E.2d 865, 868 (Va. 1964); Browne v. State,
131 N.W.2d 169, 171 (Wis. 1964); State v. Smith, 202 A.2d 669, 678 (N.J.
1964).
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specifically request counsel during the interrogation. 114 The
Supreme Court of Illinois concluded that a defendant’s confession
remained admissible despite law enforcement’s failure to
“affirmatively caution the accused of his right to have an attorney
and his right to remain silent before his admissions of guilt.” 115
And, by way of final example, the Ohio Supreme Court declined to
extend Escobedo to a defendant’s request for counsel at the time of
arrest.116
But, perhaps the biggest Escobedo-related war—one arguably most
predictive of Schneckloth—waged inside the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Inside that court,
Republican-appointee Judge Warren Burger led a conservative
bloc of judges against a separate liberal bloc led by Democraticappointee Chief Judge David Bazelon. 117 When given the
114

United States ex rel. Townsend v. Ogilvie, 334 F.2d 837, 843 (7th
Cir. 1964) (noting also that defendant failed to raise the applicability of
Escobedo until late in the appellate proceedings); Sturgis v. Maryland, 201 A.2d
681, 682 (1964) (reasoning that defendant’s failure to request counsel rendered
Escobedo inapplicable).
115

People v. Hartgraves, 202 N.E.2d 33, 36 (Ill. 1964).

116

McQueen v. Maxwell, 201 N.E.2d 701, 701-02 (Ohio 1964).

117

JOSEPH C. GOULDEN, BENCHWARMERS: THE PRIVATE WORLD OF
THE POWERFUL FEDERAL JUDGES 253 (1974). Warren Burger’s path to the D.C.
Circuit was not entirely expected. He was born on September 17, 1907, in St.
Paul, Minnesota, as one of seven children. SIGNIFICANT SUPREME COURT
OPINIONS OF CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN E. BURGER Introduction (Philippine Bar
Ass’n eds., 1984). After his graduation from high school, Justice Burger worked
for an insurance company for seven years. History: A Rich Heritage, MOORE
COSTELLO & HART, P.L.L.P, http://www.mchlaw.com/history/ (last visited June
9, 2011). During that time, one of his high school teachers remembered
Burger’s efforts and entered his application for a scholarship to Princeton
University. Id. He declined it because of his shared obligation to support his
family. SIGNIFICANT BURGER OPINIONS, supra note 117, at Introduction.
Accordingly, Justice Burger attended night classes at the University of
Minnesota. Id. Following his undergraduate graduation, he enrolled in night
classes at what is now the William Mitchell College of Law and received his
LL.B magna cum laude in 1931. Id.
After graduating from law school, Justice Burger went to work for the
relatively small firm of Faricy, Burger, Moore & Costello. Sidney E. Zion,
Nixon’s Nominee for the Post of Chief Justice: Warren Earl Burger, N.Y.
TIMES, May 22, 1969, at 36; see History: A Rich Heritage, MOORE COSTELLO
& HART, P.L.L.P, http://www.mchlaw.com/history/ (last visited June 9, 2011)
(noting the firm’s name change, that it is still in existence, and that it is the
oldest law firm in the state of Minnesota). He practiced both criminal and civil
law while accepting an adjunct faculty appointment at William Mitchell
teaching contracts. SIGNIFICANT BURGER OPINIONS, supra note 117, at
Introduction. Burger taught for twelve years and practiced with Faricy, Burger,
Moore & Costello for a total of twenty-two years until his appointment by
President Eisenhower in 1953 to the position of Assistant Attorney General for
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opportunity, a Bazelon-led panel generally aligned itself with the
Escobedo majority,118 whereas Burger-involved decisions applied
rationale from the dissent.119 Of course, what made the ideological
battle particularly interesting was that both judges’ names were, at
varying times, floated in conversations about Supreme Court
vacancies.120
As the post-Escobedo judicial battle waged on, one influential
academic saw Escobedo as a gateway to something more. In 1965,
Professor Yale Kamisar had recently joined the law faculty at the
University of Michigan after having taught for seven years at the
University of Minnesota.121 Although he would go on to author
many other influential articles and books in his still-ongoing
illustrious career,122 Professor Kamisar penned what history would
call his “masterpiece” 123 that same year—Equal Justice in the

the Civil Division of the Justice Department. Biographies of the Robes: Warren
Earl
Burger,
PBS.ORG,
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/rights/robes_burger.html (last visited
June 9, 2011). Although he sought to return to private practice three years later,
President Eisenhower talked Justice Burger into accepting an appointment to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Id. He remained on
the Circuit Court for thirteen years, from 1956-1969. Id.
118
Hutcherson v. United States, 351 F.2d 748, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(holding a defendant’s confession involuntary by relying, in part, on Escobedo);
Jones v. United States, 342 F.2d 863, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (applying Escobedo
to dismiss the indictment against defendant); Greenwell v. United States, 336
F.2d 962, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (applying Escobedo to exclude defendant’s
confession); Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d 163, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1964)
(same); Naples v. United States, 344 F.2d 508, 514 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (affirming
defendant’s conviction but citing Escobedo to support the proposition that
evidence is necessary to corroborate a defendant’s confession).
119

Cephus v. United States, 352 F.2d 663, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(declining to read Escobedo as prohibiting confessions in the absence of
counsel); Williams v. United States, 345 F.2d 733, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(declining to read Escobedo to exclude certain identification evidence);
Kennedy v. United States, 353 F.2d 462, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (same); Jackson
v. United States, 337 F.2d 136, 140 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (declining to read
Escobedo to bar the use of defendant’s confession).
120

BAKER, supra note 58, at 52.

121

Yale Kamisar—Biography, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW
SCHOOL,
http://web.law.umich.edu/_facultybiopage/facultybiopagenew.asp?ID=201 (last
visited June 12, 2011).
122

Id. (listing select publications from Professor Kamisar)

123

Ronald J. Allen, In Praise of Yale Kamisar, 2 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM.
L. 9, 14 (2004). It is difficult to overstate the influence of Equal Justice; indeed,
the piece earned Professor Kamisar the unofficial title “Father of Miranda.”
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Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure:
From Powell to Gideon, From Escobedo to . . . .124 In it, Professor
Kamisar wrote that he “would not abolish all in-custody police
interrogation”125 but, rather, would impose upon the police a duty
to inform suspects subject to incommunicado interrogation of
certain constitutional rights.126
Amidst the post-Escobedo chaos, the Supreme Court followed
Professor Kamisar’s lead and dropped the Miranda bombshell on
June 13, 1966.127 In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren wrote for a
majority of the Court, “the prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-

Terry Carter, The Man Who Would Undo Miranda, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2000, at 44,
46.
124

Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of
American Criminal Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, From Escobedo to . . . ,
in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965).
125

Id. at 10.

126

Id. at 10-11.

127

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (noting the date of
decision); Tracey Maclin, Is Yale Kamisar as Good as Joe Namath?: A Look
Back at Kamisar’s “Prediction” of Miranda v. Arizona, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
33, 34-35 (2004) (detailing the similarities between positions Kamisar took in
Equal Justice and the rationale in Miranda).
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incrimination.”128 The “procedural safeguards” to which the Court
referred are, of course, the now familiar Miranda warnings.129
Given modern citizens’ ability to recite those warnings,130 it is both
easy and tempting to forget how profound of an impact the
Miranda decision had on the public generally and the interrogation
room specifically.131 Yet, in short, the reaction was intense.132 A
New York Times piece characterized the Miranda decision as
providing “immunity from punishment for crime on a wholesale
basis.”133 Some police believed that the decision forced them to
128

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Of Chief Justice Warren, Chief Justice
Rehnquist would later write, “[f]ew would have thought of Warren as a
champion of individual rights or of minority interests at the time he was
nominated to be Chief Justice in 1953. In 1942 he was one of the leading
advocates of the evacuation and internment of the West Coast JapaneseAmerican citizens and resident aliens following the bombing of Pearl Harbor.”
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 196 (2001). Chief Justice
Warren’s pro-individual rights opinions were likewise surprising because of his
early background as Alameda County District Attorney. BAKER, supra note 58,
at 113. During that time, in 1938, after having announced his candidacy for
state attorney general, Warren would learn that his father was murdered. Id. at
113-14. In an effort to explain what many perceived to be an unthinkable
change in his legal philosophy, Warren said after his retirement, “[o]n the Court
I saw [things] in a different light[.]” Alden Whitman, For 16 Years, Warren
Saw the Constitution as Protector of Rights and Equality, N.Y. TIMES, July 10,
1974, at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted). “I wasn’t ‘softer’ on crime than
I ever was,” he continued, “[a]ll we did on the Court was to apply the
Constitution, which says that any defendant is entitled to due process and to
certain basic rights.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
129

Id. at 471 (providing warnings to a suspect that must precede
custodial interrogation).
130

ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 167 (5th
ed. 2010) (highlighting research confirming that “an astonishing number of
Americans—and, indeed, people around the world—knew about Miranda from
watching television police dramas”); JOHN C. JEFFERIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F.
POWELL, JR. 398 (1994) (remarking that “[e]veryone who watches television”
knows the Miranda warnings).
Yale Kamisar, The “Police Practice” Phases of the Criminal
Process and the Three Phases of the Burger Court, in THE BURGER YEARS 147
(Herman Schwartz ed., 1987) (“Miranda is probably the most highly publicized
criminal procedure case in our history.”).
131

WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE
INTERROGATION PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON 57 (2001). As Professor White
put it, “[c]ritics who believed the Court had placed undue burdens on law
enforcement were more numerous and less measured in their attacks on
Miranda.” Id. He added: “for at least two years after the Miranda decision,
conservative criticism of the Supreme Court was not only intense and passionate
but often very near the center of the political debate.” Id.
132

133
Arthur Krock, In the Nation: The Wall Between Crime and
Punishment, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1966, at 46.
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fight criminals “with two hands tied behind their back.” 134 The
Chief of Police in Cleveland, Ohio, claimed that the Supreme
Court made it impossible to obtain a suspect’s voluntary
statement,135 and the Los Angeles police chief predicted “that all
confessions would soon be useless.”136 Legislators even proposed
amending the constitution to overturn Miranda.137
Amid the post-Miranda frustration, 138 Judge Burger—then still a
member of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia—gave an address on May 21, 1967, at Ripon College in
Ripon, Wisconsin.139 His speech included these remarks:
I assume that no one will take issue with me when I
say that these North Europe countries are as
enlightened as the United States in the value they
place on the individual and on human dignity.
When we look at the two stages of the
administration of criminal justice in those countries,
we find some interesting contrasts. They have not
found it necessary to establish a system of
procedure which makes a criminal trial so complex
or so difficult or so long drawn out as in this
country. They do not employ our system of 12 men
and women as jurors. They do not consider it
necessary to use a device like our 5th Amendment
under which an accused person may not be required
to testify. They go swiftly, efficiently and directly
134

STEPHEN L. WASBY, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE: FROM THE WARREN
COURT TO THE BURGER COURT 183 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).
135
Fred P. Graham, Survey Shows Court Rule Curbs Police
Questioning, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1966, at 1.
136

Brian Palmer, What Happens When Your Miranda Rights Are
Revoked?, SLATE.COM, May 10, 2010, http://www.slate.com/id/2253499/ (last
visited June 17, 2011).
137

Nan Robertson, Ervin Protests Curbs on Police: Proposes an
Amendment to Upset High Court Decision, N.Y. TIMES, July 23,1966, at 36.
138

The Chief of Police in Boston, Massachusetts, expressed frustration
that “criminal trials no longer will be a search for truth, but a search for
technical error.” Fred P. Graham, Survey Shows Court Rule Curbs Police
Questioning, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1966, at 1. The Philadelphia Police
Commissioner added his belief that “[t]he present rules and interpretations
whether or not so intended—in fact protect the guilty.” More Criminals Go
Free? Effect of High Court’s Ruling, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 27,
1966, at 32.
139
RONALD L. TROWBRIDGE, WITH SWEET MAJESTY, WARREN E.
BURGER 21 (2000).
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to the question of whether the accused is guilty. By
our standards their system of finding the facts
concerning guilt or innocence is almost ruthless. In
those systems they do not have cases . . . where the
accused has countless hearings and trials and retrials and reviews over 10 or 12 years. In these long
drawn out cases everyone loses sight of the factor of
guilt and even the most guilty convict comes to
believe the press releases of his lawyer.[140]
Judge Burger’s remarks were later published in a 1967 U.S. News
and World Report, and Republican nominee Richard M. Nixon
was captivated when he read them;141 he even began to integrate
Burger’s ideas into his own 1968 presidential campaign
speeches. 142 Burger himself viewed the speech as the primary
reason that Nixon selected him to replace Warren as Chief.143
As for the 1968 election itself, it began to heat up alongside
frustrations with Miranda. 144 In May of 1968, for example,
Senator John L. McClellan decried the Miranda and Escobedo
decisions, arguing that they brought “confusion and disarray . . .
into law enforcement” and produced “deplorable and
demoralizing” results. 145 Moreover, he contended, the decisions
“weakened intolerably the force and effect of our criminal laws”
because they “set free many dangerous criminals” and “prevent[ed]
140
S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 91ST CONG., NOMINATION OF
WARREN E. BURGER 49 (Comm. Print 1969).
141

Linda Greenhouse, Warren E. Burger is Dead at 87; Was Chief
Justice for 17 Years, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1995, at A1. The White House
would later distribute copies of the speech at the time of Burger’s nomination,
“and the Supreme Court press office handed it out for years when asked for
information about his views.” Id.
142

BAKER, supra note 58, at 245.

143

TROWBRIDGE, supra note 139, at 21. When Burger was asked
whether he and Nixon had been friends, or whether some other reason existed to
suggest Burger’s appointment, Burger “said no, that the reason for the selection
owed chiefly to this one article.” Id. Nixon himself expressed concern about
nominating an individual to the Chief Justice position whom he considered a
friend. Robert B. Semple, Jr., Nixon Influenced by Fortas Affair in Court
Choices: President Says His Friends Were, and Will Be, Ruled Out of
Consideration, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1969, at 1 (“The President said the Court
required a quick infusion of men whose nominations raised no questions of close
political or personal ties to the White House.”).
WASBY, supra note 134, at 183 (noting that Miranda “seemed to
exacerbate the problem of rising crime rates and increasing racial tension”).
144

145

114 CONG. REC. 11,201 (1968).
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the convictions of others [including] known, admitted, and
confessed murderers, robbers, and rapists[.]”146 That same month,
the New York County District Attorney professed that only 15% of
defendants now gave incriminating statements post-Miranda—
compared with 49% beforehand.147 Moreover, the Chief of Police
in Fresno, California, indicated that convictions and guilty pleas
had declined dramatically since Escobedo.148
For Nixon himself, Miranda was likewise too much: “During the
1968 presidential election, Richard M. Nixon had run against Chief
Justice Warren and his Court as much as he had run against his
Democratic opponent, Hubert H. Humphrey.” 149 Indeed, Nixon
believed that the courts “[had] gone too far in weakening the peace
forces as against the criminal forces.”150 He therefore made “law
and order” a central issue in his campaign and gave speeches
decrying the Miranda and Escobedo decisions. 151 If elected,
Nixon promised on the campaign trail, he would fill the Court with
“strict constructionists.”152
Nixon was ultimately elected in 1968—largely because of his law
and order campaign, as a dejected former President Lyndon
Johnson would later concede.153 The search thereafter began for
Chief Justice Warren’s replacement in early 1969; Nixon sought a
judge who, among other characteristics, would share his view that
“the Court should interpret the Constitution rather than amend it by
judicial fiat[.]”154 Coincidentally, in March of that year, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed a
defendant’s conviction, citing an inability to determine whether
defendant waived his Miranda rights prior to confessing. 155
146

Id.
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114 CONG. REC. 14,153 (1968).

148

Id.

149

SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 329.
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The New Chief Justice, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1969, at 46; see JAMES
MACGREGOR BURNS, PACKING THE COURT 202 (2009) (noting that Nixon
repeated this “applause line[ ]” in “speech after speech”).
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STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, NIXON: THE TRIUMPH OF A POLITICIAN,
1962-1972 154 (1989).
152
Evan Thomas, Inside the High Court, TIME MAGAZINE, Nov. 5,
1979, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,912517,00.html (last
visited July 7, 2011).
153

BAKER, note 58 supra, at 259.
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Id. at 274 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Frazier v. United States, 419 F.2d 1161, 1167 (1969).
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Attacking the majority (and Miranda), Judge Burger issued a bitter
dissent, asserting in part that “[w]e are well on our way to
forbidding any utterance of an accused to be used against him
unless it is made in open court. Guilt or innocence becomes
irrelevant in the criminal trial as we founder in a morass of
artificial rules poorly conceived and often impossible of
application.”156
Reports of Burger’s dissent emerged in the local press, 157 and
Nixon noticed. 158 He would ultimately nominate Burger to be
Chief Justice on May 22, 1969; the Senate confirmed him eighteen
days later.159
B. Considering the Schneckloth opinion.
Once on the Supreme Court, Justice Burger began to reverse the
course set by his predecessor, 160 a pattern that most noticeably
156

Id. at 1176 (Burger, J., dissenting).

157

Thomas W. Lippman, Robbery Trial Overturned on Confession,
WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1969, at A1.
158
BAKER, supra note 58, at 275-76. As Justice Burger got settled as
Chief, the Nixon administration quietly instructed government attorneys that
they could offer confessions as evidence, “even if the Miranda warnings were
not properly given.” Fred P. Graham, Mitchell Wants Looser Rules on
Confessions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1969, at E12.
159

SIGNIFICANT BURGER OPINIONS, supra note 117, at Introduction.
Interestingly, Nixon also considered Associate Justice Stewart to fill the
vacancy; Stewart, however, declined interest citing his belief that it would not be
in the Court’s best interest to appoint a sitting judge as Chief. Special to the
New York Times, Excerpts from Account of Nixon’s Comments in Informal
Meeting with Reporters, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1969, at 27.
160

Many commentators are skeptical about the precise extent to which
the Burger Court truly reversed precedents created by the Warren Court. E.g.,
MALTZ, supra note 68, at 266 (asserting that Burger Court criminal procedure
decisions “modified Warren Court precedents” but “did not dramatically alter
the state of existing law”). Most agree, however, that the Burger Court—at a
minimum—eviscerated numerous Warren Court criminal procedure precedents.
Joseph M. McLaughlin, The Burger Court: A Critique, in THE BURGER COURT:
COUNTER-REVOLUTION OR CONFIRMATION 290 (Bernard Schwartz ed. 1998)
(“The most sulphurous attacks on the Warren Court were launched against its
criminal justice decisions, and, not surprisingly, this is where the Burger Court
went the furthest in rejecting the Warren Court’s legacy.”); RICHARD Y.
FUNSTON, CONSTITUTIONAL COUNTER-REVOLUTION? THE WARREN AND THE
BURGER COURT: JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING IN MODERN AMERICA 176-79 (1977)
(discussing cases that reflect the erosion of Miranda). Of particular note in this
regard is the Burger Court’s gradual degradation of Miranda. See, e.g., New
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984) (creating a “public safety”
exception to Miranda); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450 (1974)
(declining to extend the Miranda exclusionary rule to the “fruits” of a statement
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began during the 1972-73 term when Schneckloth was argued.161
Thus, one thing seemed clear when the Court considered
Schneckloth:
providing citizens with prophylactic Fourth
Amendment consent warnings would likely be an unwelcome
suggestion.
Prior to Schneckloth, the law was not clear on what “consent”
actually meant. 162 Enter Bustamonte, whose story began in
Mountain View, California, with the burglary of Speedway Car
Wash on the morning of January 19, 1967.163 Although the facts
are not perfectly clear, it seems Bustamonte was involved—along
with Joe Gonzales and Joe Alcala—in that burglary wherein the
trio took a check-writing machine and a number of blank
checks.164 The trio sought over the next couple of weeks to pass
several checks in the name of Speedway Car Wash using the
check-writing machine.165
Then, on January 31, 1967, the trio drove to San Jose to identify
individuals who might be willing to use false identification in order
to cash checks.166 They picked up three additional men around 11
taken in violation of Miranda); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971)
(allowing statements taken in violation of Miranda to be used for impeachment
purposes). The Burger Court also worked to reduce the strength of the
exclusionary rule. E.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984)
(creating a good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule);
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984) (creating a Sixth Amendment
inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule).
161

Paul C. Bartholomew, The Supreme Court of the United States,
1972-1973, 27 W. POL. Q. 164, 164 (1974).
162
Some pre-Schneckloth Supreme Court decisions treated consent as a
voluntary choice by a citizen to allow a search. E.g., Davis v. United States, 328
U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946).
Others decisions from the Court seemingly required that a citizen knowingly and
intentionally waive their rights as a prerequisite to a consensual law enforcement
search. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948); Stoner v. California,
376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964); see 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 8.31
(4th ed. 2010) (“Some courts, primarily on the federal level, applied the
knowing waiver standard to searches, while others, primarily at the state level,
continued to utilize the voluntariness test.”). Even as late as 1968, the Court
considered the constitutionality of a consent search but, in doing so, failed to
clearly indicate what standard governed the Court’s inquiry. See Bumper v.
North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968).
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People v. Bustamonte, 76 Cal. Rptr. 17, 18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
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Id. Bustamonte was not convicted for burglary; instead, he was
convicted of possessing a completed check with intent to defraud. Id.
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Id. at 18-19.

166

Id. at 19.
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p.m. and sought unsuccessfully throughout the night to cash the
checks at grocery stores, a bar, and a shopping center.167 As luck
would have it, Officer James Rand was on routine patrol at 2:40
a.m. the next morning and observed a vehicle with only one
functioning headlight. 168 He stopped the vehicle—a black 1958
Ford four-door sedan—and asked the driver, Gonzalez, for
identification.169 Of the car’s six occupants, only Alcala was able
to produce identification and, in doing so, indicated that the car
belonged to his brother.170
At that point, Officer Rand asked the occupants to exit the
vehicle.171 Rand, having been joined by two additional officers,
thereafter asked Alcala if he could search the car, to which Alcala
replied, “Sure, go ahead.”172 Officer Rand, aided by the other two
officers, searched the Ford and found three checks under the left
rear seat.173 The checks matched those stolen from Speedway Car
Wash.174 A subsequent search of Bustamonte’s car pursuant to a
warrant uncovered the check-writing machine belonging to
Speedway Car Wash and several more blank checks. 175
Bustamonte was thereafter arrested and convicted, following a jury
trial, of possession of a completed check with intent to defraud.176
He was sentenced to prison for a term of one to fourteen years.177
On appeal to the California Court of Appeals, Bustamonte
contended that the trial court improperly refused to grant his
motion to suppress for two reasons relevant to consent. First, he
argued that Alcala’s consent to search was obtained in a coercive
atmosphere and was therefore involuntarily given.178 In an opinion
167

Id.

168

Bustamonte, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 19.

169

Id.

170

Id.

171

Id.

172

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Id.
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Bustamonte, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
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Id.
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Id.

177

Brief for Petitioner at 2, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973) (No. 71-732).
178

Bustamonte, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 20. Guy O. Kornblum represented
Bustamonte pro bono on appeal to the Court of Appeal of California. E-mail
from Guy O. Kurnblum, Principal and Trial Attorney, Guy Kornblum &
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issued on March 14, 1969, the court applied a totality of the
circumstances voluntariness test and rejected Bustamonte’s
argument by noting the existence of “circumstances from which
the trial court could ascertain that consent had been freely given
without coercion or submission to authority.”179 In particular, the
court reasoned, Officer Rand testified during that the atmosphere at
the time he requested consent was “‘congenial’ and there had been
no discussion of any crime.”180
Second, Bustamonte argued that no voluntary consent could occur
unless Alcala had properly been advised that he had a legal right to
refuse consent. 181 The court rejected the argument, noting its
historical dislike of a proposed Fourth Amendment consent
warning. 182 Relying on prior precedent, the court reasoned that
“‘[w]hen permission is sought from a person of ordinary
intelligence the very fact that consent is given . . . carries the
Associates, to Brian R. Gallini, Associate Professor of Law, University of
Arkansas School of Law-Fayetteville (May 25, 2011, 14:19 CST) (on file with
author). It was, at the time, Kornblum’s first appellate case. E-mail from Guy
O. Kurnblum, Principal and Trial Attorney, Guy Kornblum & Associates, to
Brian R. Gallini, Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of
Law-Fayetteville (May 27, 2011, 13:47 CST) (on file with author). Kornblum
believes that, were the case argued today, he would have a better chance of
winning in the California courts. Id.
Thomas C. Lynch, Robert R. Granucci, and Michael J. Kelly all
represented the state of California. Lynch served as the twenty-fifth attorney
general for the State of California. Office of the Attorney General, Thomas C.
Lynch, 25th Attorney General, STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
http://ag.ca.gov/ag/history/25lynch.php.
Interestingly, Lynch knew then
Governor—and later Chief Justice—Earl Warren and once remarked, “I knew
Earl Warren fairly well, and I never heard him say a kind word about [President
Richard] Nixon.” Interview by Ameila R. Fry with Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney
General, State of California, in Berkley, Ca. 95 (1978); B OB WOODWARD &
SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 4 (1979)
(noting that Warren “could find no redeeming qualities” in Nixon). Lynch
would die of cancer at the age of 82 before Schneckloth was argued. Ex-State
Attorney General Thomas Lynch Dies at 82, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, May
29, 1986, at 50.
Granucci would go on to argue Schneckloth to the Supreme Court.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973) (No. 71-732). He also argued as Deputy Attorney General of California
in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), and earlier as Assistant Attorney
General of California alongside Lynch in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510
(1968).
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Bustamonte, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
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Id.

181

Id.

182

Id. at 21.
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implication that the alternative of a refusal existed.’” 183
Bustamonte’s conviction was therefore affirmed, 184 and the
California Supreme Court rejected his subsequent request for
additional appellate review.185
Following the denial of Bustamonte’s petition for habeas corpus at
the district court level,186 the Ninth Circuit considered the propriety
of the state court’s denial of his motion to suppress.187 Bustamonte
contended that the government unconstitutionally failed to prove
that Acala consented to the search of the Ford with knowledge that
he did not have to consent.188 On September 13, 1971, the Ninth
Circuit agreed and reversed the district court’s denial of
Bustamonte’s writ by treating consent to search as equivalent to
waiving a constitutional right. 189 That waiver, held the Ninth
Circuit, cannot be presumed from a verbal agreement to consent.190
In so doing, the court reasoned, “a reasonable person might read an
officer’s ‘May I’ as the courteous expression of a demand backed
by force of law.”191
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on February 28,
1972.192 In doing so, the Court sought to “determine whether the
183
Id. (quoting People v. MacIntosh, 70 Cal. Rptr. 667, 670 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1968)).

Id. at 23. Before affirming Bustamonte’s conviction, the court also
separately rejected his other arguments that (1) the affidavit supporting the
warrant issued to search his vehicle lacked probable cause, Bustamonte, 76 Cal.
Rptr. at 21-22, and (2) Officer Rand inappropriately commented during his
testimony on Bustamonte’s election to exercise his Miranda right to silence, id.
at 22-23.
184

185
Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 699, 699 (9th Cir. 1971). The
California Supreme Court’s order denying review is unreported. Schneckloth,
412 U.S. at 221 n.2.
186
This order is not reported. Id. at 221 n.3. Evidently, according to
Bustamonte’s counsel before the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court,
Bustamonte prepared the writ of habeas corpus in the district court without the
assistance of counsel. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (No. 71-732).
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Bustamonte, 448 F.2d at 699.
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Id. at 700.
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Id.

190

Id.
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Id. at 701.
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Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 405 U.S. 953 (1972). The petitioner,
Schneckloth, actually argued two issues, the other of which was phrased as
follows: “[w]hether claims relating to search and seizure should be available to
a state prisoner seeking to set aside his final conviction on federal habeas
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Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require the showing thought
necessary by the [Ninth Circuit].”193 In Schneckloth’s initial brief
to the Supreme Court, filed on April 20, 1972,194 he asserted that
corpus.” Brief for Petitioner at 2, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973) (No. 71-732). The majority’s election not to reach that issue prompted a
lengthy critical concurrence from Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist, who read the majority’s opinion as condoning an implicit
extension of the Mapp exclusionary rule to a federal habeas proceeding.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 271 (Powell, J., concurring) (“It makes little sense to
extend the Mapp exclusionary rule to a federal habeas proceeding where its
asserted deterrent effect must be least efficacious, and its obvious harmful
consequences persist in full force.”).
Even a cursory review of Justice Powell’s papers indicates that the
frustration voiced in his concurrence should have come as no surprise.
193

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222.

194

Brief for Petitioner at Cover Page, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973) (No. 71-732) (providing file clerk’s date stamp reflecting date
of receipt). Around this timeframe, specifically on May 1, 1972, the state of
Illinois and The Americans for Effective Law Enforcement (“AELE”) filed a
joint amicus brief. Brief for Illinois & AELE, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973) (No. 71-732). Fred E. Inbau both founded the AELE, AELE
Law Enforcement, Fred E. Inbau (1909–1998), http://www.aele.org/Inbau.html
(last visited Jan. 12, 2010), and signed onto the amicus brief, Brief for Illinois &
AELE at 24, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (No. 71-732)
(providing Inbau’s signature block).
Inbau is of course noteworthy because he developed what is now the
most popular set of interrogation techniques used in police interrogation rooms
today. FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS
212 (4th ed. 2001); FRED E. INBAU, JOHN E. REID & JOSEPH P. BUCKLEY,
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (3d ed. 1986); FRED E. INBAU &
JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1962); FRED E.
INBAU, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION (1942); see, e.g., CAROL
TAVRIS & ELLIOT ARONSON, MISTAKES WERE MADE (BUT NOT BY ME): WHY
WE JUSTIFY FOOLISH BELIEFS, BAD DECISIONS, AND HURTFUL ACTS 141 (2007)
(characterizing the Reid and Inbau text as “[t]he Bible of interrogation
methods”); WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS 25 (2001) (“Of
all the interrogation manuals, the Inbau Manual, as it is commonly known, has
been the most influential.”); Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False
Confessions and the Case for Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive
Interrogation Techniques, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791, 808 (2006) (“The
interrogation method most widely publicized and probably most widely used is
known as the Reid Technique . . . .”).
And, interestingly, Inbau founded AELE in order to counteract the
Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a decision that
both restricted an interrogator’s freedom in the interrogation room and expressly
took issue with Inbau’s interrogation methods. Fred E. Inbau (1909–1998)
Papers, Series 17/28, at 2 (Nw. Univ. Archives, 1930–1998) (unpublished
papers); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448–55 (discussing in detail the interrogation
techniques outlined by the first edition of Inbau’s interrogation text); see Yale
Kamisar, The Importance of Being Guilty, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 182,
195 (1977) (“The Miranda opinion quotes from or cites the 1953 and 1962
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third party consent searches “will become virtually impossible” if
the Ninth Circuit’s waiver standard is constitutionally required.195
More specifically, Schneckloth warned, upholding the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling would probably also require the Court to “impose a
warning requirement akin to the Miranda rule.”196 Perhaps seizing
on the ever-tenuous nature of Miranda,197 particularly in the early
years after the decision’s issuance, 198 Schneckloth pressed on,
arguing that imposing a Fourth Amendment Miranda-style
warning would contradict the great weight of authority to the
contrary. 199 And, in perhaps his most persuasive argument, 200
Schneckloth contended that no warnings were required given that
consent to search encounters rarely implicate concerns similar to
custodial encounters.201

Inbau-Reid manuals no less than ten times—and never with approval.”). He
specifically used the AELE, in part, to file amicus curiae briefs in Supreme
Court cases that involved limitations on the police. Fred E. Inbau (1909–1998)
Papers, Series 17/28, at 2 (Nw. Univ. Archives, 1930–1998) (unpublished
papers).
195
Brief for Petitioner at 7, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973) (No. 71-732).
196

Id. at 14.

197

Compare Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000)
(“We hold that Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not
be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and we decline to overrule
Miranda ourselves.”), with Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)
(“[The Miranda] procedural safeguards [are] not themselves rights protected by
the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right against
compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected.”).
198

E.g., notes 67-68, supra, and accompanying citations (noting
Burger’s criticism of Miranda at the time he was appointed as Chief Justice).
199

Brief for Petitioner at 18, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973) (No. 71-732).
200

If not his most persuasive, it was certainly an argument that
interested the Court. E.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (No. 71-732) (“QUESTION: That really isn’t
my question. Let’s assume a law enforcement officer, who is—just like these
law enforcement officers, there’s a set of regulations issued that says you need
only to be worried about consent, you need no[sic] worry about waiver
standards or Miranda warnings in getting consent in searches. That’s the rule.”);
see notes 213, 216-19, infra, and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s
additional Miranda-related questions for Schneckloth’s counsel at oral
argument).
201
Brief for Petitioner at 19-20, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973) (No. 71-732).
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In his responsive brief, filed on June 16, 1972, 202 Bustamonte
argued in straightforward fashion that evaluating a waiver of
Fourth Amendment rights requires determining whether the
individual intentionally relinquished a known right or privilege.203
Inherent in that standard, argued Bustamonte, is the need for an
individual to be informed that she may freely and effectively
withhold consent.204 Yet, Bustamonte cleverly suggested that no
Miranda-style warning was required in all cases; instead, he
asserted that informing an individual of her rights prior to her
giving consent would simply make the waiver analysis easier.205
In Schneckloth’s reply brief, filed on October 3, 1972, 206 he
persuasively argued that Fourth Amendment rights are
fundamentally different from Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.207
202

Brief for Respondent at Cover Page, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973) (No. 71-732) (providing file clerk’s date stamp reflecting
date of receipt).
203

Id. at 9.

204

Id. at 11.

205

Id. at 16-17. On this point, Bustamonte argued as follows:

It is true that a number of courts and commentators have
suggested that law enforcement officials should be required to
inform a person of his Fourth Amendment rights before
obtaining authorization to conduct a warrantless search. It is
also true that law enforcement agencies may decide to give
Fourth Amendment admonitions as a judgment of good police
practices.
However, the question before the Court is
California’s unwillingness to apply long standing criteria for
determining a waiver’s validity, not whether specific Fourth
Amendment admonitions are required in all cases. This Court
may eventually decide that such warnings are required to
ensure that Fourth Amendment rights are protected and
enforced, but the respondent’s arguments, and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision are based upon existing
authorities regarding waivers of constitutional rights.
Id. (internal citations and footnote reference omitted).
206

Reply Brief for Petitioner at Cover Page, Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (No. 71-732) (providing file clerk’s date
stamp reflecting date of receipt). The American Civil Liberties Union and The
American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California jointly filed a brief in
favor of Bustamonte as amici curiae on this same date. Amicus Brief for The
American Civil Liberties Union and The American Civil Liberties Union of
Southern California at Cover Page, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973) (No. 71-732) (providing file clerk’s date stamp reflecting date of receipt).
The substance of the brief focused only on the habeas issue. Id. at i (providing
the table of contents).
207

Id. at 2.
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That matters, he suggested, because the Fourth Amendment is not
linguistically absolute; thus, the Fourth Amendment prohibits only
unreasonable searches and seizures—as opposed to all searches
and seizures.208 Unlike the Fourth Amendment, he continued, “the
Fifth Amendment does not guarantee security from unreasonable
compulsory self-incrimination, but from all such incrimination.”209
Accordingly, he concluded, “[t]hat the Fourth Amendment is
couched in terms of reasonableness militates against a subjective
waiver standard and in favor of an objective standard for assessing
the voluntariness of consent searches.”210
Oral argument occurred on October 10, 1972, before Chief Justice
Burger and Associate Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White,
Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist. 211 Robert R.
Granucci began for petitioner-Schneckloth by provocatively
analogizing “California’s consent rule, . . . to the rule articulated
by this Court prior to Miranda for assessing the voluntariness of
confessions, [thereby] mak[ing] knowledge of one’s rights one of
the circumstances to be considered in determining
voluntariness.”212
Granucci’s focus on Miranda became pervasive. For several pages
of oral argument transcript, he either argued substantive points to
distinguish Miranda warnings from consent to search cases,213 or
responded to questions from the Justices about the role of an
officer’s request to search and the extent to which that request
208

Id.

Id. (“Neither does the Sixth Amendment say that the accused in a
criminal case shall have the assistance of counsel or a jury trial when it is
reasonable under the circumstances.”).
209

210

Id. at 2-3.

211

Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973) (No. 71-732).
212
Id. at 4; see note 178, supra, and accompanying text (noting other
arguments Granucci made before the Supreme Court).
213

E.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973) (No. 71-732) (“If we were talking about Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights, surely this Court would not countenance a third party’s
waiver of a defendant’s Miranda rights, his right to counsel, or his right to a jury
trial.”). Justice Powell apparently found this argument persuasive; he notated
the following hand-written note, which he took during Granucci’s argument:
“[w]e have held that a 3rd party may validly waive 4th Amend. This is different
from Miranda rule where no 3rd party may consent for the [defendant].” Justice
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Oral Argument Notes in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
(October 10, 1972) (on file with Washington & Lee University School of Law,
Lewis Powell Papers, Box 151, File, “Bustamonte Folder 1”).
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could be seen as a demand.214 Regardless of the setting, though,
the attention to the issue he garnered from the Court suggested that
he had hit a nerve.
When Stuart P. Tobisman got up to argue on behalf of
Bustamonte, 215 Miranda still lingered on the Justices’ minds. 216
214
Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973) (No. 71-732). At points, the Court seems concerned both about
when an officer’s request becomes a demand, and similarly when that demand
suggests a custodial encounter. Consider this representative exchange:

QUESTION: The thing that worries me is the officer comes
up and says, “Would you let me see your driver’s license?”
MR. GRANUCCI: Under California law, Your Honor, —
QUESTION: No, but if he says, “would you mind,” don’t you
usually understand that he means “you either show it to me or
else”? Isn’t that what you think?
MR. GRANUCCI: Your Honor, I can go beyond that, because
under California law a driver is required to exhibit his license
whenever an officer requests it.
QUESTION: That’s not my question. But the nice polite
police officer says, “would you mind doing it?”
MR. GRANUCCI: Yes. That is —
QUESTION: That means “give it to me.”
MR. GRANUCCI: That is —
QUESTION: That instant; that means “give it to me.”
MR. GRANUCCI: That is, Your Honor, a polite assertion of
authority.
QUESTION: Right. Right. Then he says, “Would you mind
letting me see your registration?”
MR. GRANUCCI: Again a polite assertion of authority.
QUESTION: Then he says, “May I search your car?” Then.
Now, what’s the difference?
MR. GRANUCCI: No, there may or may not be an assertion
of authority.
QUESTION: Well, what’s the difference?
MR. GRANUCCI: I think the difference is twofold. It depends
in the circumstances of the case, and it also, I think — I also
think you have to take into account the knowledge of
California drivers. You know, in our State, before you can get
a driver’s license, you have to take a rather comprehensive
examination of the responsibility of drivers.
Id.
215

Id. at 11. Tobisman and his co-counsel, Thomas Pollack,
represented Bustamonte before the Supreme Court pro bono, as they had
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Yet, the Court now expressed a more precise concern about what
those warnings might look like. At one point, for example, the
Court asked whether it would satisfy Tobisman’s proposed
standard “if the policeman had said, in addition to what he did say,
‘You are not required by law to consent, you may refuse your
consent if you wish; but if you refuse, we will be obliged to detain
you here until we can get a search warrant’?” 217 Later in the
argument, the Court asked the following:
QUESTION: Mr. Tobisman, it’s my understanding
that your opponent takes the position that the giving
of warning for a Fourth Amendment situation
would be much, much more complicated, since the
right protected is the right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure, rather than just an

throughout the Ninth Circuit proceedings. Memorandum from J. Harvie
Wilkinson III to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (March 29, 1972) (on file with
Washington & Lee University School of Law, Lewis Powell Papers, Box 151,
File, “Bustamonte Folder 1”). Tobisman continues to practice today as a partner
with the law firm of Loeb & Loeb, LLP, practicing in the firm’s trusts and
estates department. Stuart P. Tobisman—Profile, LOEB & LOEB, LLP,
http://www.loeb.com/stuart_tobisman/ (last visited June 5, 2011). Pollack, like
Tobisman, continues to practice law. Thomas Pollack—Profile, IRELL &
MANELLA, LLP, http://www.irell.com/professionals-54.html (last visited June 5,
2011). Pollack is a partner emeritus with the firm of Irell & Manella, LLP,
practicing white-collar criminal defense. Id.
As an aside, Powell’s clerk at the time, J. Harvie Wilkinson, is now a
federal judge serving on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Biographical
information:
Judge
J.
Harvie
Wilkinson
III,
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/JudgesBio/JHW_bio.htm (last visited June 2,
2011). His name once circulated as a possible nominee to the Supreme Court.
See, e.g., Associate Press, Possible Miers Replacements, USAToday.com,
October 27, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-10-27-listnext_x.htm (profiling Wilkinson as a possible nominee); Kathy Kiely, Roberts
picks up Democratic Support in Senate, USATODAY.COM, September 21, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-09-21-court-vacancy_x.htm
(“Among candidates widely mentioned are: federal appellate judges . . . J.
Harvie Wilkinson . . . .”); Bush Picks Roberts for Supreme Court,
FOXNEWS.COM,
July
20,
2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,163025,00.html
(“Other
possible
candidates were conservative federal appellate court judges . . . J. Harvie
Wilkinson III . . . .”).
216
E.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (No. 71-732). (“QUESTION: Mr. Tobisman,
as a practical matter, with the consent standard that you’re seeking to have
upheld here, does that mean that the police would have to give warnings much
as they do on the Miranda situation now?”).
217

Id. at 13.

35

absolute right to counsel. Do you have any
comment on what I understand to be his point?[218]
Of course, the broader question of whether an individual should be
told of her right to refuse consent likewise persisted throughout
Tobisman’s presentation.219
Tobisman did his best to allay the Court’s concerns about
Miranda. Consistent with the position he took in his brief on
behalf of Bustamonte, Tobisman reiterated that specific warnings
were not a talisman to demonstrate an individual’s knowing
provision of consent to search.220 As a result, he suggested, the
solution was not the requirement of warnings, but rather a revision
of the California voluntariness test.221 In place of the voluntariness
test, Tobisman suggested that the burden rested with the state to
prove that an individual whom law enforcement asks for consent
actually knew that he could say no. 222 He concluded his
presentation by reiterating that an individual can consent to a
search only if she is aware of her right to say no.223
A peek inside the Court’s conference on October 11, 1972, the day
after oral argument, reflects the Justices’ early thoughts. Chief
Justice Burger began, stating, “he wouldn’t require [consent]
warnings.”224 Instead, he said he would accept “[former State of
California Chief Judge] Traynor’s totality [test which] adds up to
reasonable under all the circumstances.” 225 Justice Brennan
218

Id. at 19.

219
Id. at 15 (“QUESTION: I suppose it would be enough to satisfy
your rule if it were clearly shown that the defendant knew what his rights were,
even though he wasn’t informed? Even though someone hadn’t — even though
the officer hadn’t given him some warning?”).
220
Id. at 14. Justice Powell was not persuaded. The hand-written notes
he took during Tobisman’s argument include this question: “How does one
show [awareness of right to refuse consent] without equivalent of Miranda[?]”
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Oral Argument Notes in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
(October 10, 1972) (on file with Washington & Lee University School of Law,
Lewis Powell Papers, Box 151, File, “Bustamonte Folder 1”).
221

Id. at 20.

222

Id. at 22.

223

Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973) (No. 71-732).
224

BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE BURGER
COURT IN ACTION 357 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).
225
Id. (calling Judge Traynor “one of the best judges never to sit on the
Supreme Court”).
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thereafter expressed his disagreement, stating that the state had to
prove consent and part of doing so obligated it to demonstrate
knowledge of the right to refuse consent.226 Justice Stewart then
intervened: “I would agree with [Brennan] that the state has to
prove consent, though not that the burden included knowledge that
he didn’t have to agree to the search[.]”227
Although Justices Marshall and Douglas expressed their agreement
with Justice Brennan, Justices Blackmun and White did not.
Justice White commented at the conference, “[the Court] can infer
from the request to search, and the consent thereto, that one knew
that he could refuse.”228 For his part, Blackmun agreed with Judge
Traynor’s approach; “I always read Ker [an earlier Supreme Court
case] as giving the states latitude to develop their own standards
[as] California did here as to its voluntariness standard.”229 Justice
Powell reduced the substance of the Court’s discussion, alongside
the Justices’ conference votes, via the following handwritten notes:
Douglas: “Consent: Affirm”
Brennan: “Affirm consent issue. If state relies on
consent, state must carry burden of proving that
party had knowledge of his rights.”
Stewart: “Consent. Must be uncoerced but state
doesn’t have to prove knowledge. Thus,”
White: “Consent. Purely a voluntariness issue.
State has no burden to show knowledge.
Marshall: “Affirm Consent. Agree with Brennan
on both issues.”
Blackmun: “Reverse Consent. Agrees with White
& Stewart.”
Powell: “Reverse Consent. Agrees with Byron &
Potter.”

226

Id. at 358.

227

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

228

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

229

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Rehnquist: “Reverse Consent. Agrees with Byron
& Potter.”
Burger: “Reverse. Calif. Rule enumerated by
Traynor – views all circumstances + determines
voluntariness.”230
Justice Powell added this note: “all votes tentative.”231
Justice Stewart distributed a first draft majority opinion on April
13, 1973 232 —sixth months and four days after oral argument.
Given the significant length of time between oral argument and the
distribution of Stewart’s first draft opinion, one wonders what
caused the delay. An applicable historical anecdote suggests the
answer: after one of Justice Stewart’s clerks returned a draft of the
Schneckloth opinion, weeks passed with no instructions or
indication of approval or disapproval. 233 The clerk became
distressed and finally asked if Justice Stewart had seen
Schneckloth. 234 “Yes,” Stewart replied, pulling open his top
drawer; “I can see it any time I want.”235 The clerk concluded that
Justice Stewart was avoiding circulating the opinion until late in
the term to preclude time for a lengthy Fourth Amendment debate;
one of the first cases argued in the 1972 term, Schneckloth was one
of the last to be decided.236
Justice White characterized the Justice Stewart’s first draft as
“very good” and joined it on April 16.237 Justice Powell joined the
same day, though he noted that he “may file a concurring

230

Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Vote Sheet in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte (October 11, 1972) (on file with Washington & Lee University
School of Law, Lewis Powell Papers, Box 151, File, “Bustamonte Folder 1”).
231

Id.

232

First Draft of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte Majority Opinion (April
13, 1973) (on file with Washington & Lee University School of Law, Lewis
Powell Papers, Box 151, File, “Bustamonte Folder 10”).
233

BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT
THE SUPREME COURT 327 (1979).
234

Id.

235

Id.

236

Id.

ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE

237

Letter from Justice Byron R. White to Justice Potter Stewart (April
16, 1973) (on file with Yale University Library Manuscripts and Archives,
Potter Stewart Papers, Box 86, File, “Folder 753”).
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opinion[.]”238 Justice Blackmun joined the opinion two days later,
noting in doing so “that this is a very significant case[.]”239 Justice
Rehnquist joined on the 19th,240 and Chief Justice Burger’s vote on
May 8 rounded out the six-member majority.241
The Court issued the Schneckloth opinion on May 29, 1973—more
than six years after the initial traffic stop that led to Bustamonte’s
arrest and over seven months after the Court heard oral argument.
The black-letter holding on the consent issue in Schneckloth is
simple: knowledge of the right to refuse consent is but one factor
in determining whether consent is valid, which is otherwise to be
determined from the totality of the circumstances.242
The rationale is more complex. At the outset of the opinion,
Justice Stewart clarified that voluntary consent is a permissible and
constitutional exception to the general requirement that officers
must possess a search warrant prior to undertaking a search. 243
The question before the Court, however, was how to define
voluntary consent.244 To begin with, the Court found instructive
the same Fourteenth Amendment interrogation cases rejected by

238
Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Justice Potter Stewart
(April 16, 1973) (on file with Yale University Library Manuscripts and
Archives, Potter Stewart Papers, Box 86, File, “Folder 753”) (“I would have
preferred to dispose of the case on the broader ground (briefed and argued) that
the exclusionary rule should not be available to a state prisoner alleging only a
Fourth Amendment violation in a federal habeas corpus proceeding[.]”).
239

Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Potter Stewart
(April 18, 1973) (on file with Yale University Library Manuscripts and
Archives, Potter Stewart Papers, Box 86, File, “Folder 753”).
240
Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Potter Stewart
(April 18, 1973) (on file with Yale University Library Manuscripts and
Archives, Potter Stewart Papers, Box 86, File, “Folder 753”).
241
Letter from Chief Justice Warren Burger to Justice Potter Stewart
(May 8, 1973) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division,
William Douglas Papers, Box 1595, File, “Folder 1(a)”).
242

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.

243

Id. at 219.

244

Id.
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Miranda, 245 yet conceded that “[t]hose cases yield no talismanic
definition of ‘voluntariness.’”246
Despite the absence of a precise definition for voluntariness in the
Court’s pre-Miranda Fourteenth Amendment confession cases, the
Schneckloth majority continued its reliance on those cases.247 In
particular, the Court observed, the voluntariness test in the context
of confession cases sought to evaluate the totality of the
circumstances in an effort to determine whether defendant’s will
was overborne.248 Those circumstances, among others, historically
included (1) defendant’s age; (2) defendant’s level of
education/intelligence; (3) whether defendant was advised of his
constitutional rights; (4) the length of defendant’s detention; and
(5) the presence of food or sleep deprivation.249 Importantly, said
the Court, none of the decisions in those cases “required the
prosecution to prove as part of its initial burden that the defendant
knew he had a right to refuse to answer the questions that were
put.”250
With voluntariness now framed in the historical context of the
Court’s pre-Miranda confession jurisprudence, the Court simply
extended the Fourteenth Amendment to Fourth Amendment
consent searches. 251 It therefore held that voluntariness is a
question of fact that turns on the totality of the circumstances.252
Although, in doing so, the Court acknowledged that the definition
of voluntariness must accommodate “the legitimate need for such
searches and the equally important requirement of assuring the
absence of coercion[,]” 253 it nevertheless candidly feared that
245

Id. at 223-24. According to the Court, it relied on pre-Miranda
cases because they contained “[t]he most extensive judicial exposition of the
meaning of ‘voluntariness[,]’” id. at 223, and because there existed prior
precedent for doing so, id. at 224 n.6 (“[W]hen we recently considered the
meaning of a ‘voluntary’ guilty plea, we returned to the standards of
‘voluntariness’ developed in the coerced-confession cases.” (citing Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1963))).
246

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 224.

247

Id. at 225-26.

248

Id. at 226.

249

Id.

250

Id. at 226-27.

Id. at 229 (“[T]here is no reason for us to depart in the area of
consent searches, from the traditional definition of ‘voluntariness.’”).
251

252

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228.

253

Id. at 227.
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requiring the prosecution to prove that a defendant knew he had the
right to refuse consent “would, in practice, create serious doubt
whether consent searches could continue to be conducted.” 254
Requiring proof of knowledge, the majority reasoned, would be
difficult for the prosecution to demonstrate; 255 meanwhile, a
defendant could seek exclusion of evidence obtained on the basis
of consent simply by testifying that he was unaware that he could
refuse to consent.256
Apart from requiring proof of knowledge, what about a warnings
regime that would simply inform prospective defendants of their
right to refuse consent? The Court answered as follows: “it would
be thoroughly impractical to impose on the normal consent search
the detailed requirements of an effective warning.”257 As to why a
Fourth Amendment warnings system would be “thoroughly
impractical,” the majority suggested the following rationale:
Consent searches are part of the standard
investigatory techniques of law enforcement
agencies. They normally occur on the highway, or
in a person’s home or office, and under informal
and unstructured conditions. The circumstances that
prompt the initial request to search may develop
quickly or be a logical extension of investigative
police questioning. The police may seek to
investigate further suspicious circumstances or to
follow up leads developed in questioning persons at
the scene of a crime. These situations are a far cry
from the structured atmosphere of a trial where,
assisted by counsel if he chooses, a defendant is
informed of his trial rights. And, while surely a
closer question, these situations are still
immeasurably far removed from “custodial
interrogation” where, in Miranda v. Arizona, we
found that the Constitution required certain now
familiar warnings as a prerequisite to police
interrogation.[258]

254

Id. at 229.

255

Id. at 229-30.

256

Id. at 230.

257

Id. at 231 (emphasis added).

258

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231-32.
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The Court even quoted the following language from Miranda to
round out its rationale: “‘Our decision is not intended to hamper
the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime. . .
.’”259
After relegating knowledge to a mere factor in the voluntariness
inquiry, the Court thereafter rejected Bustamonte’s argument that
consenting to a police search is equivalent to a waiver of Fourth
Amendment rights and, accordingly, the Court should evaluate
consent pursuant to its waiver jurisprudence.260 Were Bustamonte
correct, the prosecution would have to demonstrate “‘an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’”261
But, according to the Court, the requirement of a knowing and
intelligent waiver applied “only [to] those rights which the
Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to
preserve a fair trial.” 262 Although trial rights and Fourth
Amendment rights are both constitutional rights, the majority
reasoned that “[t]here is a vast difference between those rights that
protect a fair criminal trial and the rights guaranteed under the
Fourth Amendment.”263 Fourth Amendment rights, said the Court,
have nothing to do with promoting the fair ascertainment of truth
at a criminal trial; rather they protect the security of one’s privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police.264
Moreover, reasoned the Court, it would be “next to impossible” for
an officer to make the detailed examination demanded by the
waiver standard in the informal and unstructured context of a
consent search. 265 Although warnings could aid the waiver
evaluation, the idea of such a requirement had been “all but
universally rejected to date.”266 Finally, the Court found support in
its third-party consent cases, a review of which disclosed that
although third party consent was permissible in the Fourth

259

Id. at 232 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477).

260

Id. at 235.

261

Id. at 235 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938)).

262

Id. at 237 (emphasis added).

263

Id. at 241.

264

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 242.

265

Id. at 243-45.

266

Id. at 245 n.33.
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Amendment context,267 it was not similarly permissible in the trial
right context.268
Considering the Court’s insecurity about Miranda, perhaps the
most important argument still remained: “that Miranda requires
the conclusion that knowledge of a right to refuse is an
indispensible element of a valid consent.” 269 In rejecting that
argument, the majority reasoned that custodial interrogation is
fundamentally different from the environment of consent
searches.270 Indeed, because most consent searches occur “on a
person’s familiar territory” rather than in the stationhouse, Justice
Stewart found no reason to believe that a response to an officer’s
request for consent could be presumptively coerced. 271 The
majority therefore concluded by reiterating its position that no
reason existed to depart from the traditional totality of the
circumstances test for measuring the voluntariness of consent.272
II.
After the Court issued Schneckloth, scholars generally agreed that
it represented a deviation from how the Warren Court would have,
if given the opportunity, treated consent law.273 That deviation is
best understood as a predictable Miranda backlash; the Burger
Court was simply not in the business of expanding the rights of
criminal defendants. Miranda’s fame remains unmatched despite
Burger Court decisions, 274 but its jurisprudential impact has

267

See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969); Hill v. California,
401 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1971).
268

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 246.

269

Id. at 246.

270

Id. at 247.

271

Id.

272

Id.

273

Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the
Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 1398 (1977) (noting
Schneckloth is “another case that arguably deviates form the policy of the
Warren Court through its generous interpretation of a doctrine (search by
consent) that validates searches without probable cause”).
274

See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial
Review, 76 U. CHI. L REV. 859, 904 (2009) (referring to Miranda as “[t]he most
famous criminal procedure decision”); Eric English, You Have the Right to
Remain Silent. Now Please Repeat Your Confession: Missouri v. Seibert and the
Court's Attempt to Put an End to the Question-First Technique, 33 PEPP. L. REV.
423, 429 (2006) (“Miranda is recognized as the Warren Court's landmark
criminal law decision and remains good law today.”); Richard A. Leo, The

43

softened. 275 One wonders, then, whether the Schneckloth
majority’s assertions remain valid—was Justice Stewart right to
conclude that a Fourth Amendment right to refuse consent warning
would be “thoroughly impractical”? And, moreover, was the
Burger Court properly concerned about creating a Fourth
Amendment Miranda? In other words, would fewer people
consent if they were first told of their right to refuse consent?
This Part explores those and related questions. To do so, Section
A tests the Schneckloth majority’s “thoroughly impractical”
assertion by considering the historical considerations that likely led
to Justice Stewart’s phrasing alongside various post-Schneckloth
state court decisions. Section B then asserts that Schneckloth
warnings—i.e., a set of warnings to inform the citizens of their
right to refuse consent—would not impair law enforcement. The
absence of political, social, and judicial considerations similar to
those present in 1973, Section B asserts, suggests that Schneckloth
was wrong and, as such, requiring Fourth Amendment warnings is
a far more attractive proposition today.
A. Schneckloth warnings are not “thoroughly impractical.”
As detailed above, part of Justice Stewart’s majority opinion in
Schneckloth included the assertion that it would be “thoroughly
impractical” to provide citizens with consent search warnings.”276
Is that true? Or, instead, was Justice Marshall correct in his dissent
when he “conclude[d] with some reluctance, that when the Court
speaks of practicality, what it really is talking of is the continued
ability of the police to capitalize on the ignorance of citizens so as
to accomplish by subterfuge what they could not achieve by
relying only on the knowing relinquishment of constitutional
rights.”277 This section submits that Justice Stewart was wrong to
write that requiring Fourth Amendment warnings would be
“thoroughly impractical” and, moreover, that he may have known
Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 671 (1996)
(“The Miranda warnings may be the most famous words ever written by the
United States Supreme Court.”); Israel, supra note 273, at 1373 (“The Miranda
decision is the most highly publicized of all the Warren Court's criminal
procedure decisions . . . .”).
275

See note 160, supra, and accompanying discussion (citing cases that
tempered Miranda’s impact).
276

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231 (emphasis added).
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Id. at 288 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see HOWARD BALL, A DEFIANT
LIFE: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACISM IN AMERICA 292
(2001) (observing that Schneckloth still irked Justice Marshall in 1991—his last
year on the Court).
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he was wrong at the time he wrote the Schneckloth opinion.
Regardless, given his personal hostility toward Miranda and
Escobedo, there was little chance he might be open to extending
the rationale of those decisions to consent searches.
To better understand those latter assertions, consider Justice
Stewart’s tenure on the Court. He began on the Court in 1958 and
completed his twenty-three years of service in 1981.278 Speaking
generally, history would come to view Stewart as a pragmatist who
had a “reputation for injecting a cooling influence on the fiery
passions that frequently flared in the Court’s conference room, and
like his personal style, his opinions were cool analysis of the issues
involved in a case.”279 He is perhaps best known for his definition
of hard-core pornography: “I know it when I see it.”280
More specifically in the realm of criminal procedure, Justice
Stewart is perhaps best known for his dedication to the Sixth
Amendment; in particular, his effort to identify with precision
when the Sixth Amendment procedurally attaches and what it
protects. 281 Embodied in that pursuit, however, was his own
private discontent with both Escobedo and Miranda—alongside
his discontent with Warren Court opinions more generally.
Indeed, Justice Stewart would come to lead the justices in
percentage of dissents during the 1966 term.282
278

Potter Stewart—Biography, THE OHIO JUDICIAL CENTER,
http://www.ohiojudicialcenter.gov/p_stewart.asp (last visited July 1, 2011).
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BAKER, supra note 58, at 155.
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Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,

concurring).
281
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (stating, per Stewart,
“the right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments means at
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judicial proceedings have been initiated against him”); Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (holding, per Stewart, that defendant “was denied the
basic protections of [the Sixth Amendment] when there was used against him at
his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had
deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of
his counsel”); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (arguing, despite that the Sixth Amendment was yet incorporated,
that “the absence of counsel when this confession was elicited was alone enough
to render it inadmissible under the Fourteenth Amendment”). See Jesse C.
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449 (2011) (noting the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was a doctrine that
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By the time of Escobedo in 1964, Stewart had already made his
position clear that he favored an automatic right to counsel
pursuant to the Sixth Amendment at the procedural point when the
suspect became the accused.283 Escobedo’s interpreting the Sixth
Amendment to apply to the interrogation room—in other words,
prior to a formal charge—particularly frustrated Stewart and
prompted him to break from his otherwise even-keeled opinionwriting. 284 In his Escobedo dissent, he passionately wrote the
following:
Supported by no stronger authority than its own
rhetoric, the Court today converts a routine police
investigation of an unsolved murder into a distorted
analogue of a judicial trial. It imports into this
investigation constitutional concepts historically
applicable only after the onset of formal
prosecutorial proceedings. By doing so, I think the
Court perverts those precious constitutional
guarantees, and frustrates the vital interests of
society in preserving the legitimate and proper
function of honest and purposeful police
investigation.[285]
With that language in mind, it is hardly surprising that he dissented
again two years later in Miranda. In Miranda, however, Stewart
declined to pen his own dissent, instead electing to join opinions
authored by Justices Harlan and White. The first, by Justice
Harlan, echoed Justice Stewart’s sentiments in Escobedo; indeed,
said Harlan, “[Miranda] represents poor constitutional law”286 that,
like Escobedo, could not be “sustained by precedents under the
Fifth Amendment.”287 Justice White’s dissent went further. Citing
his Escobedo dissent, White commented in Miranda that he saw
“nothing wrong or immoral, and certainly nothing unconstitutional,
in the police’s asking a suspect whom they have reasonable cause
precedent established during the Warren Court. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT
ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 406 (1979).
283
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Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 494 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Miranda, 384 U.S. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

Id. at 512. Harlan thought the Miranda majority’s discussion of
Escobedo in was surprising because, he said, “it contains no reasoning or even
general conclusions addressed to the Fifth Amendment . . . .” Id. at 512 n.9.
287
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to arrest whether or not he killed his wife . . . at least where he has
been plainly advised that he may remain completely silent[.]”288
Of course, White famously added his belief that Miranda would
“have a corrosive effect on the criminal law as an effective device
to prevent crime.”289
Immediately after Miranda’s issuance, academics and other court
commentators got to work assessing the accuracy of Justice
White’s prediction.290 One 1967 study, conducted by Yale Law
School, examined police behavior during interrogations in New
Haven, Connecticut in an effort to assess that very statement.291 It
found, after observing well over one hundred interrogations over
three months, 292 “that warnings had little impact on suspects’
behavior.”293 Indeed, the study reported, “[n]o support was found
for the claim that warnings reduce the amount of ‘talking.’”294
The Yale study was hardly the only effort, completed prior to
Schneckloth, to assess what impact Miranda would have on the
effectiveness of law enforcement. Indeed, studies popped up
examining Miranda’s impact in New York, 295 Philadelphia, 296
D.C., 297 Detroit, 298 Pittsburgh, 299 and Los Angeles. 300
In D.C.,

288
Id. at 538 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 499
(White, J., dissenting)).
289
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Attorney’s Office of Los Angeles County Regarding the Effects of the Dorado
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post-Miranda, nearly forty percent of suspects gave incriminating
statements to the police post-arrest, compared to forty-three
percent who gave statements pre-Miranda.301 The Pittsburgh and
Los Angeles studies similarly saw little change post-Miranda.302
In Detroit, “the rate of confessions increased . . . after the police
instituted a system of warning suspects of their constitutional
rights.”303 Criticized surveys conducted by prosecutors’ offices in
Philadelphia and New York were alone in finding that Miranda
caused a drop in confession and conviction rates.304
Accordingly, by the time of Schneckloth in the early 1970s, the
Miranda storm began to subside. As a New York Times story in
1972 observed, “[n]o better proof could be found that the oncecontroversial procedural limitations have not really handcuffed the
police than the fact that the police have largely quit complaining
about them.” 305 Additional studies conducted in Denver, 306
Knoxville, 307 and Southern California, 308 among others, 309 all
and Miranda decisions Upon the Prosecutions of Felony Cases, 5 AM. CRIM. L.
Q. 32 (1966).
301

Medalie, supra note 297, at 1414 (Table E-1).

Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 299, at 26 (“[T]he Pittsburgh
figures collected through this study support the generalization that Miranda has
not impaired significantly the ability of the law enforcement agencies to
apprehend and convict the criminal.”); Younger, supra note 300, at 34 (“The
percentage of cases in which confessions or admissions were made has not
decreased, as might have been anticipated, because of the increased scope of the
admonitions required by Miranda.”).
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(1974) (evaluating the impact of Miranda on Prairie City, Oregon, and
concluding the decision’s impact has been “minimal”); NEAL A. MILNER, THE
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sought to further the effort to evaluate Miranda’s impact on law
enforcement. Like their predecessors, however, each concluded
that Miranda did not significantly diminish the prevalence of
confessions.310 Thus, while Justice Stewart wrote in Schneckloth
that consent warnings would be “thoroughly impractical,” he did
so while the academic and law enforcement communities’ reached
the almost uniform conclusion to the contrary about Miranda
warnings.
Perhaps, then, it is unsurprising that several states have since
questioned Schneckloth and its accompanying rationale. The
Mississippi Supreme Court, in “sharp departure” from
Schneckloth, requires a “knowledgeable waiver . . . before
consenting to a search.”311 Contrary to Schneckloth’s reasoning,
the New Hampshire Supreme Court noted the possibility for
coercion in knock-and-talk procedures, though it stopped short of
requiring warnings. 312 The Minnesota Supreme Court has
similarly recognized problems of pretext and inherent coercion
when officers seek a citizen’s consent during traffic stops. 313
Finally, in Indiana, an appellate court has suggested that the “better
practice” would be for officers to identify themselves and provide
warnings during knock-and-talk encounters;314 rather than hamper
police investigations, “such an advisement would minimize
needless suppression motions, hearings, and appeals.”315
Still others have gone so far as to interpret their own state’s
constitution to require right to refuse consent warnings. In 1975,
COURT AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT; THE IMPACT OF MIRANDA 223 (1971)
(reporting a significant, but temporary, decline in Chicago clearance rates,
though conviction rates remained relatively constant).
310

Leiken, supra note 306, at 47 (explaining that suspects in the study
did not meaningfully understand their Miranda rights and therefore willingly
waived them); Stephens et al., supra note 307, at 424 (observing that although
officers disapproved of Miranda, it still “left room for traditional forms of
interrogation”); Witt, supra note 308, at 325 (noting a 2% decline in confessions
in Southern California post-Miranda).
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Id. at 497-98. The court further stated that the “best practice would
be for the officer to obtain written consent” and noted that such forms were
already in use throughout the state. Id. at 498 (citing state cases involving
written consent forms).
315
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for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that an “essential
element” of voluntary consent “is the knowledge of the right to
refuse.”316 Accordingly, the court adopted a waiver requirement,
thereby requiring the government to prove that consenting
individuals knew that they could refuse consent.317
Two decades later, the Supreme Court of Hawaii held, in the “walk
and talk” investigative encounter context, that consent cannot be
voluntary if obtained through the “material nondisclosure” of
failing to advise the individual that the officer is investigating
crime and that the individual is free to go at any time.318 Shortly
thereafter, the Supreme Court of Washington held that warnings of
the right to refuse, to limit, and to withdraw consent were required
when officers sought consent to search a citizen’s home. 319 In
doing so, the court rejected Schneckloth’s impracticality argument
on an empirical basis—citing its own cases where officers obtained
consent despite providing warnings, and studies reflecting
Miranda’s minimal impact on law enforcement. 320 Finally, and
most recently, Arkansas adopted a rule requiring notice of the right
to refuse consent in knock-and-talk searches.321
Considering a handful of states that do require warnings, one
commentator recently reported, “even with requirements more
stringent than the bare warning requirement that was rejected in
Schneckloth, there was little effect on the rate of consent.”322 The
totality of the foregoing suggest that Justice Stewart wrote tonguein-cheek that right to refuse consent warnings would be
“thoroughly impractical.” Indeed, as one commentator concludes
about the Schneckloth reasoning, “[p]erhaps it was all a joke.”323
316
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B. Historical circumstances suggest the modern need for
Schneckloth warnings.
Miranda warnings are now standard police practice. 324 And,
despite the outrage surrounding Miranda’s initial issuance,325 the
decision’s requirement that officers provide certain warnings to
suspects subject to custodial interrogation has, as the early
Miranda-impact studies posited, not diminished confessions.326
Consistent with conclusions reached by the early Miranda-impact
literature in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s,327 Miranda
scholarship in the 1980s offered more of the same: law
enforcement had learned to live with Miranda and most officers
believed that Miranda posed no “serious” law enforcement
problems.328 A couple of Miranda impact studies reconfirmed the
decision’s limited impact either on local prosecutors,329 or juvenile
defendants.330 Importantly, however, the 1980s seemingly saw a
resurgence of academic scholarship reevaluating Miranda.331 One
324
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325
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individual, Professor Joseph Grano, was particularly—and
pervasively—critical of Miranda, often arguing that no problem
existed by creating an uneven playing field when interacting with
potentially guilty suspects.332
Academic scholarship in the 1990s expanded upon Professor
Grano’s Miranda-based criticisms by venturing into the empirical
realm in an effort to demonstrate Miranda’s harmfulness. 333
Professor Paul Cassell led a vocal charge asserting, in a variety of
articles, that prior Miranda impact studies had understated the
decision’s harmful impact on confessions. 334 Other empirical
332
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690 (1986) (asserting that the newest edition of Reid & Inbau’s interrogation
manual helps to demonstrate “how misguided our recent direction has been”);
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Article III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U.L. REV. 100, 110-11 (1985) (questioning the
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literature sought to move past the early post-Miranda studies;
indeed, Professor Richard Leo asserted in his mid-1990s study of
multiple police departments in California that whether Miranda
significantly impacted law enforcement had become a “sterile
issue.”335 But even more modern scholarship has again confirmed
Miranda’s acceptance in the law enforcement community, 336 and
its contextually minimal impact on confessions.337
Whatever conclusion should be drawn from the Miranda impact
literature about its precise impact on law enforcement, one thing
seems clear: informing citizens of their rights does not, as Justice
White feared in his Miranda dissent, 338 significantly impair law
enforcement. People are indeed still confessing.339 But why? An
early post-Miranda study concluded that, assuming suspects
understood their rights, they nonetheless confessed for one of
several reasons: (1) they did not trust a lawyer offered by the
police; (2) they wanted to talk only to people “who would let me
know what [they were] up against;” (3) preoccupation with other
concerns; (4) a concern for being hit or beaten by the police; (5) a
desire to convince the police of their innocence; (6) a hope for
leniency; or (7) an overarching compulsion to speak.340 Given that
the intensity of the interrogation room environment persisted postMiranda, that factor alone contributed most significantly to
suspects’ continued willingness to confess.341
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Similar logic pervades during the police-citizen consent search
encounter. The limited empirical research available to explain why
people consent to search—despite some being warned of their right
to refuse consent—reveals that citizens are simply afraid.342 Stated
with more precision, citizens’ fear of an officer’s reprisal is the
primary reason why people consent to search.343 Other researchers
have concluded, more basically, that “man’s innate tendency to
obey authority can impair his decision making and, ultimately, dull
the understanding with which he exercises his constitutional
rights.”344
Given the apparent overlap between the circumstances prevalent in
Fourth and Fifth Amendment police-citizen encounters, 345 there
seems good reason to apply Miranda-related empirical research to
consent searches—despite what the Schneckloth Court believed.346
And, assuming that warnings do not significantly impair law
enforcement, then Justice Stewart must be wrong; it would not be
“thoroughly impractical”347 to require that officers provide citizens
with a consent search Fourth Amendment warning. It therefore
seems difficult to rationalize retaining Schneckloth as good law or,
at a minimum, declining to adopt one of the fundamental
propositions rejected by the Schneckloth majority: “proof of
knowledge of the right to refuse consent [as] a necessary
prerequisite to demonstrating a ‘voluntary’ consent.”348
Equally if not more important than the implications of Mirandarelated empirical research on consent searches is the modern
absence of a President preoccupied with a single Supreme Court
decision alongside a series of justices appointed to overrule that
decision. In contrast, by the time Bustamonte’s case emerged
Confession, 14 J. PUB. L. 25, 27 (1965) (reviewing literature that reflects
suspects feel burdened by guilt and confessing alleviates that burden).
342
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before the Supreme Court, Nixon was confident that his four
appointees were well on their way to his stated mission: overrule
Miranda. 349 Admittedly, Miranda was never overruled, but the
Burger Court did something equally remarkable: it told citizens
that they had no right to be informed of their constitutional rights
during a police-citizen encounter involving a request for their
consent search.
Yet, the Schneckloth decision received a dearth of media attention.
Although the New York Times reported the issuance of the
Schneckloth opinion on the front page of its May 30, 1973,
newspaper, alongside the issuance of Cupp v. Murphy,350 that day’s
paper was unaccompanied by an editorial about Schneckloth’s
implications.351 The substantive story did, however, characterize
the decision as part of a “continuing trend on the Court toward
majorities that favor the protection of society as a whole as against
the rights of the accused. Appointees of President Nixon formed
the core of both majorities.” 352 The Schneckloth opinion’s farreaching ramifications seemingly came and went in 1973 without
significant notice by the academic community either.353
Aryeh Neier, Nixon’s Court: Its Making and Its Meaning, TIME
MAGAZINE, Nov. 1, 1971, at 18 (noting that criminal law is “the President’s
special concern” and that Miranda is “[t]he principal target”).
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The initial absence of media and academic attention paid to
Schneckloth belies its impact on citizens’ day-to-day lives. Given
that so few citizens commit a crime, 354 a correspondingly
insignificant number of those citizens will face off against an
officer during an interrogation; after all, Miranda does not apply to
anything other than custodial interrogation. 355 Yet, outside the
interrogation room, 43.5 million (of 288.4 million) persons in
2005, for example, had at least one police contact; 56% of those
contacts arose in a traffic-related context.356 Given the popularity
of consent searches amongst officers,357 the traffic stop carries with
it the real potential that citizens will be asked for consent to search
their cars. 358 Roadside questioning, after all, is not custodial
interrogation within the meaning of Miranda.359 The Burger Court
therefore pulled off—under the radar mind you—telling America
that officers may constitutionally seek your consent to search
without informing you of your rights during any and every policecitizen encounter. Putting aside the irony, telling criminal suspects
their rights, but not ordinary citizens is, in a word, remarkable.
The Burger Court’s doing so was, as discussed at length above, the
predictable result of pushing back against the Warren Court legacy
and a corresponding effort to restore a perceived absence of “law
and order.” The Burger Court was indeed simply doing what
Nixon foresaw even before he appointed Chief Justice Burger.
Thus, in hindsight, the composition of the Schneckloth majority
and its preoccupation with Miranda is unsurprising. Chief Justice
Burger’s criticism of Miranda prior to his joining the Court, 360
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alongside his thematic criticism of the Warren Court,361 suggests
that his vote to join Justice Stewart’s opinion was preordained. So
too perhaps were the other Justices’; when, for example, Justice
Rehnquist joined the Court in 1971,362 he did so “with a desire to
counteract some ‘excesses’ of the liberal activist Warren
Court[.]”363 And, as Assistant Attorney General, Rehnquist gave a
speech at the University of Arizona,364 during which he suggested
“that the Court should overrule decisions like Miranda, without
feeling bound by ‘stare decisis[.]’”365 One commentator, reflecting
on Rehnquist’s voting record, confirmed a “consistency between
the views he indicated before his appointment to the Court and his
record on the Court[.]”366
Votes from Justices Powell and Blackmun, as Nixon appointees
and Miranda critics, were likewise foreseeable.367 So too was the
vote cast by Justice White, author of a vigorous Miranda dissent in
which he claimed that Miranda would “measurably weaken”368 the
361
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from reality for so long.” LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN
44 (2005). Other letters from Burger to Blackmun included language describing
the members of the Warren Court as “phonies” and “mediocrities.” Id. at 25.
362

92 CONG. REC. 46,197 (1971).

363

Stuart Taylor, Jr., Opinions Set Legal Experts Buzzing, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 28, 1988, at 182; accord John A. Jenkins, The Partisan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
3, 1985, at SM28 (reporting Justice Rehnquist’s comment that the Burger Court
“called a halt to a number of the sweeping rulings that were made in the days of
the Warren Court”).
364

David E. Rosenbaum, William Hubbs Rehnquist, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
22, 1971, at 25.
365

Alan Dershowitz, The Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1971, at E1.

BAUM, supra note 318, at 144. Rehnquist’s vote in Schneckloth may
have been particularly foreseeable given his long-lasting distaste for Miranda.
At the Court’s annual Christmas party in 1975, Rehnquist and his clerks
composed and sung a Christmas carol parody designed to mock remaining
members of the Miranda majority. ROBERT SCHNACKENBERG, SECRET LIVES OF
THE SUPREME COURT 199 (2009).
366

367
Stephen Wasby, Justice Harry A. Blackmun: Transformation from
“Minnesota Twin” to Independent Voice, in THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL
AND JUDICIAL PROFILES 93 (Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern eds., 1991)
(discussing Blackmun’s “unhappiness with Miranda”); Fred P. Graham, The
“Nixon Court”: A Premature Label?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1972, at 8 (reporting
that the four Nixon appointees “are all critics” of Miranda and Escobedo);
Aaron Epstein, Abortion Decision is His Legacy: Blackmun Defended
Individuals’ Rights, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Apr. 7, 1994, at 6A (discussing the
close voting relationship between Blackmun and Burger during their early years
on the Court).
368

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 541.

57

criminal law because “[i]n some unknown number of cases . . . [it
would] return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the streets and to
the environment which produced him, to repeat his crime
whenever it pleases him.”369 Justice Stewart, the opinion’s author,
although not a Nixon appointee, 370 was likewise predictable; he
often helped to form necessary majorities following the Nixon
appointments.371
The takeaway point is therefore hopefully clear: all of the majority
Justices’ positions in Schneckloth were more than foreseeable.372
Indeed, the 1972-1973 term was the first full term for all of
President Nixon’s appointees373—Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist.374 And, during that term, the
Nixon-appointed justices remarkably agreed in more than 100 of
all the 177 cases heard375—they were even more closely aligned in
criminal procedure cases.376 As a result, the Burger Court for the
first time that term effectuated a gradual but pronounced shift away
from Warren Court values in the context of criminal defendants’

369
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rights. 377 Its doing so was unsurprising; by the time of
Schneckloth, only two Justices from the five-justice Miranda
majority remained on the Court.378
But similar circumstances do not persist today. Overlap between
then and now unquestionably exists, 379 but only the temporal
period surrounding Bustamonte’s case can claim ownership over
Miranda—and the Supreme Court’s preoccupation with it.
Commentators, politicians, and citizens have since seen no
criminal procedure case issued by the Supreme Court that is
similar to Miranda in terms of its fame and impact.380 Congress
does not now seek to limit the Court’s jurisdiction or its pay.381
Senators do not spend time on the senate floor seeking to convince
colleagues that legislation is required to overrule the Court’s
criminal procedure decisions.382 Outside of Congress, civil unrest
does not litter our streets. 383 Politicians do not criticize the
Supreme Court as a “lousy, no account outfit,” 384 or build
campaigns around replacing the Court’s Justices.385 But, perhaps
most telling of the temporal differences between now and when the
377
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Mar. 21, 1972, at 1 (“Only two Justices who joined the 5-to-4 Miranda decision,
William J. Brennan, Jr., and William O. Douglas, are still on the Supreme Court
Court.”). The five members of the Miranda majority were Chief Justice Warren
and Associate Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and Fortas. Christopher E.
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Court issued Schneckloth, signs do not litter the country’s
landscape calling for the impeachment of Chief Justice Roberts.386
Even the Supreme Court has tacitly acknowledged that
circumstances have changed since Miranda. In 2000, the Court in
Dickerson v. United States both reaffirmed that Miranda is a
constitutional decision and, in doing so, added that “Miranda has
become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the
warnings have become part of our national culture.” 387 Amidst
other rulings that seemingly narrow the breadth and scope of
Miranda’s applicability,388 the Court has also recently issued a pair
of rulings that arguably expand Miranda’s core holding requiring
warnings.389
The totality of the foregoing clearly reflects that reason no longer
exists to uphold Schneckloth as the law on consent. In its place,
commentators have often suggested that police officers be required
to advise a suspect of her right to withhold consent prior to
requesting permission to search. 390 Any such warning should
likely also include a caution to suspects of their right to temporally
or spatially limit their grant of consent.391 That warning scheme
386

Cf. note 58, supra, and accompanying citations (documenting the
placement of “Impeach Earl Warren” signs around the country).
387

530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (citations omitted).

388

Berghuis v. Thompkins, -- U.S. -- , 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010)
(narrowing the applicability of the right to remain silent by requiring that a
suspect unambiguously invoke the right); Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. -- ,
129 S. Ct. 2079, 2091 (2009) (holding that waiver of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel is no longer tied to Miranda’s Fifth Amendment right to counsel).
389

J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. -- , 131 S. Ct. 502 (2011)
(holding that a child’s age is a relevant factor for determining Miranda custody);
Florida v. Powell, -- U.S. -- , 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1203-04 (2010) (holding that
suspects have a right to have their lawyer present during police questioning, and
the police are required to inform suspects of that right as part of their Miranda
warnings).
390

Barrio, supra note 16, at 247; accord Phillips, supra note 17, at
1203-05; Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 211, 252-54 (2002); Aaron H. Mendelsohn, The Fourth
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makes particular sense given Justice Marshall’s observation in his
Schneckloth dissent that the Federal Bureau of Investigation for
years routinely informed subjects of the right to refuse
consent392—a practice that has persisted well beyond the timing of
Schneckloth.393
Detractors of this thesis may rightly suggest that the Supreme
Court would be loath to overrule Schneckloth, particularly given
the Court’s current composition. Critics may likewise suggest that
a more modern Supreme Court already declined the opportunity to
overrule Schneckloth in 1996 when it held in Ohio v. Robinette that
officers need not inform lawfully seized citizens that they are free
to go prior to requesting consent to search.394
As to point one—that the modern Supreme Court is unlikely
willing to overrule Schneckloth—there is but one response: fair
enough. After all, many thought at the time of Dickerson that the
Court should seize the opportunity to overrule Miranda395—which
it declined—particularly with Rehnquist serving as Chief Justice.
But the Fifth Amendment requires Miranda warnings and states
are not free to reject them.396 In contrast, states are free to reject
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Schneckloth and require Fourth Amendment consent warnings.397
And, as demonstrated above, a significant handful of states have
rejected Schneckloth or, at a minimum, questioned its reasoning.
Thus, although it remains highly unlikely that the Court would
overrule Schneckloth, it at least has historically acknowledged the
climate of state approaches to certain doctrines 398 alongside a
willingness to evaluate poorly reasoned opinions.399
As to point two, the problem with suggesting that Robinette was
the appropriate—or even a vehicle400—for overruling Schneckloth,
however, resides again with timing. By the time of Robinette’s
issuance, the Rehnquist Court was well into furthering its
predecessor Court’s pattern of narrowing precedents favorable to
the accused 401 and, just as important, Chief Justice Rehnquist
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authored the majority opinion in Robinette. 402 In doing so,
Rehnquist emphasized then what he found persuasive back in
1973—Justice Stewart’s initial 403 and final thoughts about
consent:404
And just as it “would be thoroughly impractical to
impose on the normal consent search the detailed
requirements of an effective warning,” so too would
it be unrealistic to require police officers to always
inform detainees that they are free to go before a
consent to search may be deemed voluntary.[405]
Given that lingering alliance between Schneckloth majority
members Rehnquist and Stewart, 406 using Robinette as a vehicle
for overruling Scheckloth seems unlikely indeed.
A final question perhaps remains amongst doubters of this thesis:
why bother with right to refuse consent warnings if suspects, to
begin with, suspects do not invoke their Miranda rights?407 Apart
from dissipating the coercive environment of a police-citizen
encounter and helping to decrease the possibility of pretext, 408
Justice Goldberg answered this question long ago in Escobedo:
[N]o system of criminal justice can, or should,
survive if it comes to depend for its continued
402
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effectiveness on the citizens’ abdication through
unawareness of their constitutional rights. No
system worth preserving should have to fear that if
an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he
will become aware of, and exercise, these rights. If
the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the
effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then
there is something very wrong with that system.[409]
His words are persuasive now as they were then. Justice Goldberg
was, however, before his time. Modern society is now again
prepared to embrace his logic and similar logic espoused long ago
by the Supreme Court:
The tendency of those who execute the criminal
laws of the country to obtain conviction by means
of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the
latter often obtained after subjecting accused
persons to unwarranted practices destructive of
rights secured by the Federal Constitution, should
find no sanction in the judgments of the courts
which are charged at all times with the support of
the Constitution and to which people of all
conditions have a right to appeal for the
maintenance of such fundamental rights.[410]
CONCLUSION
In 1973, the Supreme Court held that providing a right to refuse
consent warning to citizens would be “thoroughly impractical.”
Doing so at that time perhaps made sense. The political, social,
and judicial circumstances were truly unique; the Burger Court—
wary of creating another Miranda—was in no mood to provide
additional prophylactic warnings. Nixon all but made sure of the
Court’s mood by packing the Court with four anti-Miranda justices
of his choosing.
But, today, similar circumstances do not persist. Miranda has not
been overruled; rather, it has been affirmed. Along the way,
researchers have exhaustively confirmed that Miranda has not
409
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significantly impaired law enforcement. Citizens therefore remain
entitled to know of their Fifth Amendment rights anytime they are
in police custody and subject to interrogation. Logic suggests that
citizens should likewise be told of their Fourth Amendment rights
during the far more likely chance that they are involved in an
encounter with the police. In short, “[t]here is no war between the
Constitution and common sense.” 411 The Constitution affords
citizens the right to refuse an officer’s request to search their
person or property; common sense dictates that officers tell them
that.
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